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Abstract
Financial crises spread across countries through a variety of channels. A crisis
originating in one market may propagate in an alternative form and have different
impact in another market. The spread of crises through existing trade and finan-
cial linkages may be anticipated; however, during periods of stress, transmission
in excess of these linkages is frequently observed. It is this excess transmission,
known as financial contagion, which is the focus of this dissertation.
Contagion is one of the important mechanisms by which a financial crisis may
become systemic. Consequently it is important for policy makers and market
participants alike to identify the channels by which crises transmit and to assess
the extent of contagion risk in global markets. Understanding contagion risk
helps frame policies to reduce the immediate impact of a crisis and to undertake
long-term structural reform policies for financial stability.
This dissertation examines contagion between international equity markets
during the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. It identifies channels (com-
mon factor, idiosyncratic factor, structural shift and volatility spillovers) by which
crisis shocks transmit across borders and uses a variety of econometric techniques
to test for the existence and extent of contagion during this period. The chan-
nels of contagion identified are shown to relate to the probability and severity of
banking crises. While existing research largely focuses on tests for contagion at
aggregate market level, this thesis compares aggregate results with those for the
financial sector, and finds – perhaps surprisingly – that there is somewhat less
evidence at the financial sector level.
v
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The empirical evidence in the dissertation shows that both advanced and
emerging equity markets are exposed to contagion risk through the idiosyncratic
shocks emanating from the crisis originating market (here the US). While emerg-
ing markets are as affected as developed markets at aggregate market level, the
financial sectors of advanced economies are less exposed to the idiosyncratic shock
channel than the emerging markets. Banking sectors across the world are shown
to be significantly exposed to contagion. Most have evidence of contagion from
some or all four channels. However, contagion associated with the idiosyncratic
shock channel has the largest impact – it increases the probability of a banking
crisis by 27 percent, suggesting policy makers may wish to design policies aimed
at mitigating these effects.
Finally, the dissertation empirically relates the evidence for systematic risk
for large US financial firms with existing empirical measures of systemic risk.
Using high frequency equity data to separate the responsiveness of these firms to
jumps and continuous movements in market prices reveals that firms have higher
jump beta than continuous beta. Further, the aggressiveness of the jump beta
response of the institutions is positively related to systemic risk measured by
capital shortfall and negatively to systemic risk measured by interconnectedness.
The evidence compiled in this thesis confirms the existence and extent of con-
tagion effects across international equity markets, including their banking sectors,
focusing on the crisis of 2007-2009. It offers empirical evidence on the relative
importance of considering the source and channel of the crisis transmissions as
well as the structure of the domestic banking sector in formulating policy and
investment portfolio responses to periods of stress.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over last few decades, the financial markets around the world have experienced
several episodes of financial crises, notably the Latin American crises in 1990s,
the Asian crises in late 1990s, and very recently the global financial crisis (GFC).
Financial crises often start in one country and spread to others. Such interna-
tional propagation of a crisis is known as financial contagion. In this dissertation,
we define contagion as a significant increase in cross-market co-movements dur-
ing the crisis period which is above and beyond the co-movement during the
pre-crisis period.1 Theory suggests that interconnected economic fundamentals
such as trade and financial linkages among or between the countries can cre-
ate avenues to transmit a crisis across the borders, and early empirical studies
show that countries with weak economic fundamentals are prone to contagion
(Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998; Kaminsky and Schmuk-
ler, 1999; van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). The considerable changes in the
financial markets over last few decades, due to financial globalization including
the removal of restrictions on the cross-border flows of goods and services have
been associated with exposure to contagion (Bekaert et al., 2005; Kalemli-Ozcan
et al., 2013). However, the mechanisms by which a crisis transmits across borders
and constitutes contagion are not well understood. Empirical evidence suggests
1See Chapter 2, Section 2 for detail.
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limited explanatory power of economic linkages for contagion, and behavioural
theories postulate that market idiosyncrasies, often attributed to the behaviour
of market participants, play important roles to propagate a crisis internationally
(Boyer et al., 2006; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Dungey
et al., 2005; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002; Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Moser, 2003; Yuan,
2005).
The GFC of 2007-2009 started in the United States and rapidly spread across
global financial markets resulting in a sharp decrease in stock market indices, and
a widespread failure of financial institutions. The latter phenomenon refers to a
systemic crisis where failure of one or more financial institutions leads to insta-
bility of the overall financial system which by then incurs a huge cost, financially
and economically, to stabilize the system. The contagious and systemic nature
of the crisis has increased the concern about the stability of the financial system
and the overall economy. Policy makers around the world introduced a variety
of unconventional policy measures such as bailouts, debt and deposit guarantees,
liquidity supports and capital injections to stabilize the financial sector and the
real economy at large (Ait-Sahalia et al., 2012; Benetrix and Lane, 2015; BIS,
2010; Klyuev et al., 2009; Mishkin, 2011). Although sound economic fundamen-
tals and prudential regulations are preventative measures within the remit of
domestic authorities, financial crises transmitted from other jurisdictions present
a considerable threat to domestic economies (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013). In
this context identifying contagion through all potential channels is important, as
contagion through different channels may require different policy prescriptions.2
Identifying and understanding multiple contagion sources and their contribution
to market volatility and amplification of the crisis promote the financial stability,
hence, reduce the economic and social costs of a crisis.
2For example, economic isolation or quarantining an economy, such as by imposing capital
controls, could be appropriate for idiosyncratic shocks as they represent temporary phenomena.
However, the same could not be the solution for common shocks as they limit the functioning
of the interdependent markets (Rose and Spiegel, 2010).
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The existing empirical literature highlights the contagion effects in equity mar-
kets during the GFC. Baur (2012) finds that many advanced and emerging equity
markets experienced significant contagion effects coming from the global equity
market and the global financial sector had significant impact on real economy
sectors. Aloui et al. (2011) and Hwang et al. (2013) also find evidence of con-
tagion in emerging markets. Bekaert et al. (2014) and Rose and Spiegel (2010),
however, find little evidence of crisis shock effects from the US to other countries
during the GFC. Bekaert et al. (2014) find that the impact of the crisis in highly
integrated economies is less pronounced than in economies with a lower level of
global integration, which is contrary to the globalization hypothesis which claims
that financial markets with a high level of global integration are affected the most
by the crisis (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013). Such contradictory empirical findings
in the existing literature provide incentives for further investigation to better un-
derstand contagion in global equity markets and have important implications for
public policies, portfolio allocation and asset pricing.3
This dissertation examines contagion in equity markets around the world dur-
ing the GFC using a range of econometric approaches and models and provide
a significant association between contagion and systemic dimension of a crisis.
Our analysis exploits a factor model approach to identify the potential channels
by which crisis shocks may transmit internationally and constitute contagion. It
is difficult to identify and isolate the explicit economic linkages, and implicit be-
havioural aspects of contagion empirically. The factor model includes a latent
process representing a common factor which explains market interdependence
through economic linkages, and the idiosyncratic factor which captures the be-
3For example, the policy measures to ease monetary conditions during a crisis emphasise
on mitigating the crisis effects channelized through particular mechanisms (see eg Joyce et al.
(2012)). Joyce et al. (2012) argue that the implementation of quantitative easing as a response
to the GFC was to reduce the crisis effect through portfolio rebalance. In addition, during a
crisis, an investor who suffers large losses may reduce her risk by selling assets at the distressed
or fire prices. If a fire sale leads to a sharp reduction in the price of an asset, values of similar
assets held by other investors may decline leading to a downward spiral in asset prices (Shleifer
and Vishny, 2011).
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haviour of market participants. In addition, the factor model is flexible enough
to incorporate a potential structural shift in the relationship between countries
during a crisis period which is above and beyond that accounted for economic link-
ages (Bekaert et al., 2014; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), and the volatility spillovers
in international financial markets (Chiang and Wang, 2011; Diebold and Yilmaz,
2009; Edwards and Susmel, 2001; Hamao et al., 1990). The approach nests several
other empirical approaches for testing contagion (Bae et al., 2003; Baur, 2012;
Bekaert et al., 2005, 2014; Corsetti et al., 2005; Dungey et al., 2005, among
others).
The first essay of this dissertation, Chapter 2, examines the evidence for
contagion from the US equity market to the equity markets of world’s largest
advanced and emerging economies. While the existing literature on detecting
contagion during the GFC largely focuses on advanced economies, we provide a
comparative analysis of advanced and emerging economies. We further examine
contagion at the financial sector level across the countries; sectoral level analysis
is rare in the existing literature. A notable exception is Baur (2012). However,
our empirical approach is different from Baur’s approach in the sense that his
focus is on contagion through observable common factor whereas our focus is on
contagion through unobservable idiosyncratic factor. We decompose the mar-
ket volatility for recipient markets and examine the contribution of contagion to
market volatility. As the literature suggests that the financial markets of ad-
vanced economies are more integrated and interdependent than that of emerging
economies, we hypothesize that the equity markets of advanced countries are
more likely to experience contagion compared to the equity markets of emerging
economies. We expect the evidence to be more pronounced at financial sectoral
level because financial sectors across the world have higher levels of global inte-
gration than other sectors, which we hypothesise makes them more vulnerable to
contagion.
From an empirical perspective, the conventional approach of measuring conta-
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gion focuses on correlation coefficients or beta coefficients, the statistical measures
of co-movements and how such parameters change during the crisis period com-
pared to pre-crisis period. The literature suggests that ignoring time varying
volatility while estimating such parameters may produce biases (Dungey et al.,
2005; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Forbes and Rigobon (2002) propose an ad-
justment in cross-market correlation, considering the increased volatility of the
source market during the crisis period. Dungey et al. (2005) indicate that, even
with the proposed adjustment, the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test may fail to
detect contagion perhaps due to a structural break or shift in the underlying
relationship between the two markets. Dungey and Renault (2013) offer a condi-
tional factor model within a generalized method of moments (GMM) framework
which accounts for heteroskedasticity and considers the potential change in struc-
tural relationship during the crisis period. Therefore, relaxing the assumption of
homoscedasticity in financial data in Chapter 2, we re-examine contagion using
the approaches of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Dungey and Renault (2013)
in Chapter 3. Here, we focus on the contagion through a common factor. Allen
and Babus (2009) argue that a crisis may break down the existing network of
relationships across the markets. If that is the case, we are most likely to observe
a structural break in the common factor exposure across the financial markets
during the crisis period.
The global banking markets were hit hard by the crisis. Problems in the sub-
prime mortgage market in the US in 2007 caused significant disruption to the in-
ternational interbank market. The subsequent failures of Bear Stearns (in March
2008) and Lehman Brothers (in September 2008) amplified the crisis. When
the crisis spread globally, the banking systems of many countries experienced a
systemic banking crisis. Banking sectors in Europe and emerging markets were
affected (Acharya and Schnabl, 2010; Fecht et al., 2012; Kalemli-Ozcan et al.,
2012). Fecht et al. (2012) document the extensive external interbank on-balance
sheet linkages of banks. Hence, interbank markets are inherently vulnerable to
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contagion (Iyer and Peydro, 2011; Upper, 2011). The potential for contagion
to ignite systemic crises has led to concern amongst policy makers over the risk
of contagion and associated threats to financial stability. The resilience of the
domestic financial system to a systemic crisis depends not only on the indus-
try characteristics such as bank capital, market concentration and modalities of
the banking activities, but also on the crisis shocks (contagion) from outside the
domestic system. To address this issue, in Chapter 4, we propose a multifac-
tor model that generalises the linkages across the banking sectors by identifying
four possible channels - market interdependence, market idiosyncrasies, structural
shift (potentially capturing herd behaviour) and market volatility, and examine
which of these four channels were effective in transmitting the crisis in the bank-
ing markets around the world during 2007-2009 and specifically account for the
contribution of the domestic banking sectors in contributing to a systemic crisis
in recipient countries. In doing so we contribute to filling a gap in the literature
about the systemic dimension of contagion effects.
One of the important characteristics of international equity markets is that
they tend to experience jumps, and that these jumps often occur simultaneously
across the markets leading to higher comovements (Das and Uppal, 2004). Such
increased comovement between the markets is akin to the definition of financial
contagion in the literature. Although the jumps are infrequent events and repre-
sent the unexpected arrivals of the news in the markets causing significant price
discontinuities, a high degree of correlation of risk of jumps across the markets
or assets represents systemic risk (Das and Uppal, 2004). The literature suggests
that firms respond differently to market jumps (Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010).
In other words, the systematic risk of individual stocks differs when there is a
jump in the market returns. Nicolo and Kwast (2002) argue that if systematic
risk responses across financial firms move closely together there is inherent sys-
temic risk in the aggregate financial system. The GFC put the spotlight on the
systemic risk and systematic risk of financial institutions. The systematic risk or
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the market risk measures the magnitude of comovement of a firm with respect to
the market whereas systemic risk measure the impact of the failure of one firm on
the market. Both of these risks are associated with capital regulation (Acharya
et al., 2010; Gauthier et al., 2012; Kashyap et al., 2010). More specifically, the
systematic risk is more frequently linked with micro-prudential capital regula-
tion, whereas the systemic risk is often associated with macro-prudential capital
regulation.
The literature suggests that systematic risk (beta) plays an important role
in estimating banks’ cost of capital, and therefore lending rates and economic
activities (Baker and Wurgler, 2013; Gilchrist et al., 2013; Kashyap et al., 2010;
Miles and Ezzell, 1980). But the conventional capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
beta does not capture the time-varying nature of systematic risk (Ferson and
Harvey, 1993; Jagannathan and Wang, 1996), and is not robust to the price
discontinuities or jumps in the market portfolio (Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010).
There is an evolving strand of literature using high frequency financial econo-
metric techniques to identify jumps in the price process and to measure and dis-
entangle systematic risk into systematic continuous risk and systematic jump risk
(Alexeev et al., 2014; Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard, 2004; Lee and Mykland,
2008; Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010). There is also a growing body of litera-
ture that examines systemic risk in the financial sector. For example, Acharya
et al. (2010) provide a new theoretical framework for measuring systemic risk and
Brownlees and Engle (2012) implement this to develop a SRISK index, which
captures the vulnerability to the deterioration in equity capital of the financial
system. The aggregate SRISK measure also provides early warning signals of
distress in the economy. Dungey et al. (2012) also provide an index, SIFIRank,
for measuring systemic risk based on interconnectedness amongst firms.4 The
4In addition, there are other systemic risk measures such as CoVar proposed by Adrian and
Brunnermeier (2011) and CATFIN proposed by Allen et al. (2012). The CATFIN, however,
measures the systemic risk at macro level - the banking sector affects the macro-economy
through an aggregate lending channel.
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literature, however, does not explore how systematic and systemic risks are in-
terrelated. Chapter 5 of this dissertation attempts to fill this gap.
In Chapter 5, we disentangle the systematic risk of large US financial firms
into systematic jump risk and systematic continuous risk, and relate systematic
jump risk with the empirical measures of systemic risk provided in Brownlees and
Engle (2012), and Dungey et al. (2012). More specifically, we first detect jumps
in the price process of financial sector index using the conventional approach of
Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) and measure the contribution of jumps
to the financial sector volatility.5 The literature suggests that the jumps are
rare and unexpected events which lead to significant changes in the asset prices.
Therefore, we expect few jump events in our sample market portfolio. Second, we
estimate financial firms’ responses (betas) to continuous and jump components
in the market price process. We apply Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) approach
to decompose the CAPM beta into continuous beta and jump beta and provide
monthly estimates for the sample period. The literature suggests that jumps in
market portfolio may yield different systematic risk exposure to the individual
stocks; jump beta is larger than continuous beta. Finally, we examine the impact
of systemic risk and firm characteristics on jump betas. We use SRISK and
SIFIRank as proxies for systemic risk. As SRISK measures the systemic risk
based on equity capital and the financial firms with lower equity are more sen-
sitive to market movements, we expect that financial firms with higher SRISK
will have higher jump beta. Considering the potential resilience power of inter-
connected network, we expect that financial firms with higher SIFIRank (less
interconnected) will have higher jump beta.
Finally, Chapter 6 summaries the implications of the research findings of this
study, presents its limitations and outlines potential avenues for further research.
The results imply that policies addressing idiosyncratic shocks and bank capital
5See Dumitru and Urga (2012) for comparison of different jump detection methodologies in
the literature.
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regulation help to reduce the financial and real economic consequences during
times of stress. The results for systematic risk imply that market jumps may
lead to changes in the systematic risk of financial firms, which may in turn affect
their cost of capital and therefore have implications for the bank capital regu-
lation. The results from this dissertation also imply that investors can benefit
from international portfolio diversification in emerging markets, even during a
crisis period. The within-country idiosyncratic factor explains a large proportion
of market volatility in emerging markets, and the correlation coefficients between
the US equity market and equity markets of other economies reduce significantly
when we adjust for heteroskedasticity in return series during the crisis period.
Chapter 2
Equity Market Contagion during
the Global Financial Crisis:
Evidence from the World’s Eight
Largest Economies
2.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis (GFC), which began when the US real estate bubble
burst in 2007, quickly led to a sharp decline in stock market indices in the US
and across global financial markets – both advanced and emerging. Over the
crisis period (from July 2007 to May 2009), the US equity market alone lost
about 40 percent of its market capitalization. The loss is even higher for some
other countries. For example, the UK equity market lost about 49 percent and
the Russian equity market about 52 percent. At a sectoral level, the financial
sectors around the world experienced even greater losses (in percentage points).
The US financial sector experienced a loss of approximately 60 percent in its
market capitalization, the UK financial sector lost about 66 percent, and the
Russian financial sector about 70 percent. These facts show the severe impact of
10
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the global financial crisis on financial markets around the world. An important
question is whether this increased co-movement of global financial markets during
the 2007–2009 crisis provides evidence of contagion. Defining contagion as a
significant increase in cross-country co-movement of asset returns, we test for the
existence of contagion and measure contagion effects running from the US to both
advanced and emerging markets. The focus of our analysis is on the aggregate
equity market in general and the financial sector in particular.
We take the latent factor approach of Dungey et al. (2005), which nests several
other empirical approaches (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002;
Corsetti et al., 2005) in a unifying framework to test for contagion. Our sample
consists of the US (as a crisis originating country) and eight other large economies
in terms of GDP (the four largest advanced economies – France, Germany, Japan
and the UK – and the four largest emerging economies – BRIC: Brazil, China,
India and Russia). We use a relatively large sample period (daily returns data
from 2004 to 2010) and determine crisis and non-crisis periods using an Iterative
Cumulative Sum of Squares (ICSS) approach (Inclan and Tiao, 1994; Sanso et al.,
2004).
Our results provide strong evidence of contagion effects from the US equity
market to equity markets in both advanced and emerging markets. Contagion
from the US explains a large portion of the variance in stock returns in advanced
and emerging economies. However, the contagion effect is lower in financial sector
index than in the aggregate equity market, particularly in advanced economies.
The results for the financial sector cast doubt on the financial globalization hy-
pothesis – that is, whether contagion during the crisis has a greater effect on
those markets that are highly integrated. Overall, our results are consistent with
previous studies on equity market contagion during the GFC (Aloui et al., 2011;
Baur, 2012; Bekaert et al., 2014; Hwang et al., 2013). However, unlike Bekaert
et al. (2014), we find large contagion effects in equity markets. The literature on
cross-country contagion effects measured only in the financial sector is relatively
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limited. Hasman (2013) provides an overview, pointing out that much of this
work is related to the literature on prudential regulation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the litera-
ture on financial contagion, Section 2.3 explains the latent factor model, sample
and data, and empirical model specification, results and discussion are presented
in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Defining Financial Contagion
There is no unanimously accepted definition of financial contagion. The definition
is closely tied to the statistical definition of how the spread of market disturbances
is measured. For example, Eichengreen et al. (1996) define contagion as a sig-
nificant increase in the probability of a crisis in one country, conditional on a
crisis observed in an origin country. Hamao et al. (1990) refer to contagion as
a volatility spillover from crisis country to other countries. Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) and Dungey et al. (2005), amongst others, refer to contagion as a signifi-
cant increase in the co-movements of prices across markets conditional on a crisis
occurring in one market or a group of markets.
The World Bank summarizes three layers within contagion definitions.1 In a
broad sense, contagion is the cross-country transmission of shocks or the general
cross-country spillover effects. In a restrictive sense, contagion is the transmis-
sion of shocks to other countries, or the cross-country correlation, beyond any
fundamental links amongst the countries and beyond common shocks. In a very
restrictive sense, contagion refers to an increase in the cross-country correlations
during crisis period relative to the correlations during normal period. The very
restrictive definition is commonly used in recent empirical analysis to identify
1http://go.worldbank.org/JIBDRK3YC0
2 Equity Market Contagion during the Global Financial Crisis 13
and measure financial contagion (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Dungey et al., 2005,
among others). This chapter follows this convention.
2.2.2 Mechanisms of Crisis Transmission
The literature includes two groups of theories, which are not necessarily mutually
exclusive, explaining crisis transmission mechanisms. One group argues that the
economic fundamentals of different countries are interconnected by their cross-
border flows of goods, services, and capital. When a crisis originates in one
country, this interdependence of economies through real and financial linkages
becomes a carrier of crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998; Glick and Rose, 1999;
van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). In addition, global phenomena or common
shocks such as a major economic shift in industrial countries, significant changes
in oil prices, changes in US interest rates, and changes in exchange rates may
adversely affect the economic fundamentals of several economies simultaneously,
and potentially may cause a crisis (Eichengreen et al., 1996). These fundamental
based effects are also known as ‘spillovers’ (Masson, 1999), ‘interdependence’
(Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) or ‘fundamentals based contagion’ (Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 1998).
Another group of theories argues that financial crisis spreads from one coun-
try to another due to market imperfections or the behaviour of international
investors (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; King and Wadhwani, 1990; Masson, 1999;
Dornbusch et al., 2000; Kodres and Pritsker, 2002).Information asymmetries make
investors more uncertain about the actual economic fundamentals of a country.
A crisis in one country may give a “wake-up call” to international investors to re-
assess the risks in other countries, and uninformed or less informed investors may
find it difficult to extract the informed signal from the falling price and follow the
strategies of better informed investors, generating excess co-movements across the
markets (Calvo and Mendoza, 2000; Goldstein, 1998; Pasquariello, 2007; Yuan,
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2005). The degree of anticipation of a crisis by investors is crucial for the existence
of contagion because of investors’ attention allocation (Mondria and Quintana-
Domeque, 2012). Sudden shifts in market confidence and expectations have been
identified as important factors in causing contagion (Masson, 1999; Mondria and
Quintana-Domeque, 2012).
The initial empirical literature on financial crisis and contagion focused on fun-
damentals based mechanisms and was directed towards developing early warning
systems (Eichengreen et al., 1996; Kaminsky et al., 1998; van Rijckeghem and
Weder, 2001), while later empirical works are focused on investor behavior-based
mechanisms (Dungey et al., 2005; Bekaert et al., 2014).
In an early and influential study, King and Wadhwani (1990) examine the
correlation between the US, UK and Japanese stock markets during 1987–1988 (a
stock market crash occurred in 1987). They find evidence of increased correlation
between the US, UK, and Japanese stock markets during the 1987 crisis which
cannot be explained by economic fundamentals. Baig and Goldfajn (1999) use
a similar approach to examine financial contagion in Asian markets during the
Asian crisis and find that the correlation across the countries for the same asset
class (stock markets, interest rates, sovereign bond spreads and exchange rates)
increased significantly during the crisis period.
In a seminal paper, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) provide a breakthrough on
the conventional correlation analysis approach for testing contagion. As volatility
increases during a crisis, an increase in correlation may simply be a continuation
of strong transmission mechanisms that exist in more stable periods. Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) offer an adjusted correlation coefficient approach to test
for contagion in 28 stock markets and three episodes of crisis. They conclude
that the observed increase in correlation during crisis period is due to increased
interdependence amongst the markets, not contagion.
In a slightly different fashion, Dungey and Martin (2001); Bekaert et al. (2005);
Corsetti et al. (2005); Bekaert et al. (2014), amongst others, follow a factor model
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of correlation analysis to test for contagion during different episodes of financial
crises.
There is a growing body of empirical literature testing for financial conta-
gion during the GFC. Using a broad set of data from 55 advanced and emerging
countries, Bekaert et al. (2014) examine the transmission of crises to country-
industry equity portfolios in 55 countries during the global financial crisis. Using
a CAPM-based approach, they find systematic and substantial contagion from
domestic equity markets to individual domestic equity portfolios, with its sever-
ity inversely related to the quality of countries’ economic fundamentals. They
find limited evidence of contagion running from US markets and from the global
financial sector, and conclude that investors focus substantially more on country-
specific characteristics (idiosyncratic risks) during the crisis period. However, in
a slightly different empirical setting, Baur (2012) uses sectoral level data from 25
countries (advanced and emerging) and examines the spread of financial crises
from the financial sector to the real sector within a country and across countries
during the crisis. He finds strong contagion effects and claims that no region
or specific group of countries has been immune to shocks associated with crisis;
however, real economy sectors, especially healthcare, telecommunication and the
IT sector, were less affected by contagion.
The existing literature on detecting contagion during the GFC consistently
finds evidence for significant contagion effects. However, only a few papers con-
sider evidence for the BRIC countries. Kenourgios et al. (2011) find contagion
between the BRIC countries, the US and the UK for 5 historical crisis events
using weekly data. Hwang et al. (2013) find evidence of contagion for China,
Russia and India (but omit Brazil from their study). On the other hand, Sama-
rakoon (2011) finds no evidence of contagion from the US to China or Russia in
the GFC, and shows that in the case of India shocks from the US exacerbated
the difference between US and Indian returns (that is, contagion operated in the
opposite direction than expected). The author finds identifiable contagion effects
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only for Brazil and in general concludes that the evidence is stronger for conta-
gion to Latin America than other markets. The US–Brazil contagion linkage is
also strongest in Aloui et al. (2011). The authors also find that the commonality
between the US and Brazil and the US and Russia is stronger than that for the
US and China and the US and India.
A stylized fact of the GFC is that financial markets around the world suffered
from tremendous losses. However, there remains disagreement on the interna-
tional transmission of the crisis and its mechanisms; in particular, whether the
international transmission of the crisis resulted from interconnected global mar-
kets (through real and financial linkages) or was caused by idiosyncratic factors
(attributed to behaviours of market participants during the crisis period). The
divergent empirical findings on contagion tests largely depend on how the crisis
transmission channel is defined and how it is implemented in an empirical set-
ting (Dungey et al., 2005). The detection of contagion effects requires a formal
definition and measurement of the underlying shocks. A number of approaches
suggest that contagion is evident only in the tail (or extreme) events of market
returns. In this case they may, for example, look for the coincidence of tail re-
turns across different markets or assets, as done by Bae et al. (2003) or Boyson
et al. (2010), or for the effects of outliers in one market on those in another as
in Favero and Giavazzi (2002). Proponents of the non-linear nature of contagion
effects support mechanisms such as copula, DCC or GARCH frameworks (Aloui
et al., 2011; Busetti and Harvey, 2011; Caporin et al., 2013; Hwang et al., 2013;
Kenourgios et al., 2011). Dungey et al. (2005) show how a latent factor model of
the entire sample nests the coincident tail and outlier approaches. At the present
time there is no literature showing the dominance or otherwise of the copula ap-
proach relative to other methods. Caporin et al. (2013) do not find any evidence
that the quantile approach results in a different outcome to that obtained from
the entire distribution.
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2.3 The Empirical Framework
2.3.1 The Latent Factor Model
The latent factor model is based on the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM)
framework. Let the return on an asset, yi,t , during the non-crisis period be
a function of a common factor, wt, which affects all the asset markets, and an
idiosyncratic factor, ui,t, which is specific to a particular asset market. The
relationship can be expressed as:
yi,t = λiwt + δiui,t; i = 1, 2, ..., N (2.1)
where i refers to the market i, and t refers to time. The λi and δi refer to factor
loadings of common factor and idiosyncratic factors, respectively. The factors are
assumed to be latent stochastic processes with zero mean and unit variance. The
factors are orthogonal to each other, and the covariance of idiosyncratic factors
across different markets is assumed to be zero:
wt ∼ i.i.d.(0, 1) (2.2)
ui,t ∼ i.i.d.(0, 1) (2.3)
E[wtui,t] = 0∀i (2.4)
E[ui,tuj,t] = 0 ∀i 6= j. (2.5)
Therefore, for the pre-crisis period, the unconditional variance and covariance
of yi,t can be expressed as:
E[y2i ] = λ
2
i + δ
2
i (i = 1, 2, ...N) (2.6)
E[yi, yj] = λiλj (i = 1, 2, ...N) ∀i 6= j, (2.7)
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Assume that a crisis originates in the first market via an idiosyncratic shock.
During the crisis period, the idiosyncratic factor of the first market may affect
the returns on assets in other markets in a way which does not occur during the
non-crisis period. This avenue is identified as a contagion channel. Therefore,
during the crisis period, the return on assets in each market can be expressed as:
y1,t = λ1wt + δ1u1,t (2.8)
yj,t = λjwt + δju2,t + ϕj,1u1,t; j = 2, ..., N. (2.9)
That is, the potential effect of shocks which originated in the first market
(the US in our context) on other markets during the crisis period is given by the
parameter ϕj,1, and a test of whether ϕj,1 = 0 will be a test against the null of
no contagion.
If we allow contemporaneous shocks across the markets, then Eq. (2.8) and
(2.9) can be expressed as:
yi,t = λiwt + δiui,t +
N∑
i=1,i6=j
ϕi,juj,t; i = 1, ..., N. (2.10)
Now the test of contagion relies on the statistical significance of the ϕi,js.
For the crisis period, as in Eq. (2.6), the variance of yi,t, based on Eq. (2.10)
can be expressed as:
E[y2i ] = λ
2
j + δ
2
i +
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
ϕ2i,j (i = 1, 2, ...N) . (2.11)
The contribution of each factor can be represented as the proportion of volatil-
ity of yi explained by common shocks, idiosyncratic factor and contagion respec-
tively:
λ2i
λ2i + δ
2
i +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i ϕ
2
i,j
;
δ2i
λ2i + δ
2
i +
∑N
i=1,i 6=j ϕ
2
i,j
;
ϕ2i,j
λ2i + δ
2
i +
∑N
i=1,i 6=j ϕ
2
i,j
. (2.12)
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Eq. (2.12) provides the descriptive measure of the relative strength of conta-
gion in contributing to the volatility of returns during the crisis period. In this
way the latent factor approach of Dungey et al. (2005) provides not only a test
for contagion but also a measure of the relative strength of contagion explaining
market volatility.
2.3.2 Sample and Data
Along with the US as the crisis origin country, we focus on four major ad-
vanced economies (France, Germany, Japan and the UK) and four major emerging
economies (BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India and China) to examine the international
transmission of the crisis. The selection of these countries is based on their size
(in terms of gross domestic product, GDP) and their economic/market structure.
The five advanced economies are the largest five countries from the advanced
economy group and the four emerging economies are the largest four countries
from the emerging economy group as classified by International Monetary Fund.2
These nine markets together make up about 62.1 percent of world GDP (authors’
calculation based on 2010 GDP in current US dollars).3
Our sample period covers from January 02, 2004 to December 31, 2010. Fol-
lowing (Dungey et al., 2005) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we use daily data
for aggregate equity market index and financial sector index, extracted from
Thompson Reuters Datastream and compute daily returns as the log difference
of the daily price index. To overcome the geographical time differences problem
(amongst the sample economies), we use Day 01 in US and Brazil = Day 02 in
European and Asian markets markets. We also performed sensitivity analysis by
using a two-day moving average (as in Forbes and Rigobon (2002)), as well as
data without time adjustment. The results are robust to these changes.
2http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx, accessed on
15/04/2012.
3http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, accessed on 15/04/2012.
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2.3.3 Identifying Crisis Dates
The empirical literature on financial contagion suggests that the results are sen-
sitive to the data windows and choice of crisis date (Dungey et al., 2005). Cor-
relation based studies often rely on exogenously determined crisis dates. In this
chapter, we use endogenously determined crisis and non-crisis periods. We use an
Iterative Cumulative Sum of Square (ICSS) algorithm based on the CUSUM test
to detect the structural change in variance of an individual return series (Inclan
and Tiao, 1994; Sanso et al., 2004) and first applied to crisis period detection by
Wang and Nguyen Thi (2012).
The ICSS approach assumes that return series exhibit a stationary variance
over an initial period until a sudden change in variance occurs and then becomes
stationary again for a time until the next sudden change. This process is repeated
through time, yielding a number of changes in the variance(Aggarwal et al., 1999).
Consider the demeaned asset return series, εt, which is normally distributed with
σ2t . For the whole sample of T observations, the variance within each interval is
denoted by τ 2j , j = 0, 1, ...NT , and 1 < k1 < k2 < ... < kNT < T are the dates of
break in variance,
σ2t = τ
2
0 ; if 1 < t < k1,
= τ 21 ; if k1 < t < k2,
...
= τ 2NT ; if kNT < t < T.
(2.13)
To estimate the number of changes in variance and the point in time of each
variance shift Inclan and Tiao (1994) define a Dk statistic as follows:
Dk =
Ck
CT
− k
T
; k = 1, ..., T |D0 = Dt = 0 (2.14)
where, Ck =
∑k
t=1
2
t , k = 1, ..., T is the cumulative sums of squares of t from the
beginning of the series to kth point in time. If there are no changes in variance over
the sample period, the Dk statistic oscillates around zero and asymptotically, be-
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Table 2.1: Structural breaks in the US equity and financial index returns
SN Description Aggregate equity index Financial sector index Remarks
1 First break July 19, 2007 July 19, 2007 Crisis period begins
2 Second break September 12, 2008 July 4, 2008 Heightened period
3 Third break June 1, 2009 May 29, 2009 Crisis period ends
4 Fourth break September 3, 2010 December 12, 2010 Post crisis period ends
haves as a standard Brownian motion (Inclan and Tiao, 1994).4 If there is one or
more sudden variance changes in the series, the Dk values drift either up or down
from zero (Aggarwal et al., 1999). Sanso et al. (2004) offer modifications to the
ICSS algorithm incorporating heteroskedasticity and fourth moment properties
of financial data and replace Dk by Gk = ω˜4(Ck− kTCT ), where ω˜4 is a consistent
estimator of ω4, the long-run fourth moment of t (Sanso et al., 2004).5 The
null hypothesis of no break in variance is rejected when Gk∗ = Maxk(|T−0.5Gk|)
is outside the confidence interval range. The simulation based critical value (at
α=5%) for Gk∗ is 1.406.
Table 2.1 provides the results for the ICSS test to our sample. The break
dates are approximately equivalent to GFC period defined by the World Bank
(BIS, 2009) and the US recession end date defined by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER, 2010). Since the crisis began in the financial sector,
we choose the financial sector break dates. Therefore the crisis period considered
in this chapter is from July 19, 2007 to May 29, 2009.
2.3.4 Stylized Facts and Descriptive Statistics
Unlike previous financial crises, such as the Mexican crisis of 1994 and the Asian
crisis of 1997– 1998, which were often regional in nature and lasted for a relatively
4This can be observed by plotting Dkvalues against k.
5The non-parametric estimator of ω4 is:
ω˜ =
1
T
∑T
t=1(
2
t − σ˜2)2 +
2
T
(
m∑
l=1
ω(ι, ω)
T∑
t=l+1
(2t − σ˜2)2(2t−l − σ˜2)2 (2.15)
where ω(ι, ω)is a Bartlett window and ω˜4 estimate depends on the choice of m parameter with
the Newey-West method (Sanso et al., 2004).
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate equity market price index for advanced countries
Note: The right hand side scale applies to US and left hand side scale applies to rest. The
price index is measured in US dollars and re-indexed to 100 on January 1, 2000. Data source:
Thompson Reuters Datastream.
short period of time, the GFC lasted for about two years. This crisis affected
both the advanced economies and the emerging economies in our sample. As
revealed in Figure 2.1 and 2.2, before the crisis, the equity market indices of
these economies were increasing gradually. When the crisis hit over the period
from July 2007 to May 2009, the US equity market alone lost about 40 percent
of its market capitalization, the French equity market lost about 46 percent, the
German equity market about 41 percent, the Japanese equity market about 35
percent, and the UK equity market about 49 percent. The magnitude of the crisis
effect in emerging markets, however, is relatively low. For example, China, India,
and Brazil lost equity market capitalization by about 23, 24, and 25 percent,
respectively. The Russian equity market lost the most at about 52 percent.
The effect of the crisis is more severe in the financial sector. The US finan-
cial sector lost about 60 percent of market capitalization, whereas the French,
German, and Japanese financial sectors lost about 58 percent, 50 percent and
45 percent, respectively, and the UK financial sector experienced the highest
loss (about 66 percent) amongst the advanced economies. The loss figures for
the financial sector are about 10–20 percent above the loss in the overall equity
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate equity market price index for emerging countries and the
US
Note: The right hand side scale applies to US and left hand side scale applies to rest. The
price index is measured in US dollars and re-indexed to 100 on January 1, 2000. Data source:
Thompson Reuters Datastream.
markets for each country. In the case of emerging economies, except for Russia,
the loss faced by the financial sector is about 30 percent. The Russian financial
sector experienced an approximate 70 percent loss in its market capitalization
during the global financial crisis, which is the highest loss amongst all the mar-
kets investigated. All these markets experienced negative returns over the crisis
period, and their market volatility (standard deviation) approximately doubled
compared with the non-crisis period. US financial sector volatility increased by
approximately fourfold. These facts indicate the severity of this crisis.
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 reveal that while emerging markets expe-
rienced relatively lower negative returns than advanced markets during the crisis
period, emerging markets were relatively more volatile than advanced markets at
the same time. During the non-crisis period, the emerging markets had higher
returns than the advanced markets. Furthermore, in the advanced economies, the
overall equity market portfolio has higher returns than the financial sector port-
folio, whereas in the emerging markets, the financial sector portfolio has higher
returns than the aggregate equity market portfolio. The higher performance of
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the financial sector in emerging markets could be attributed to banking-oriented
capital markets, less market competition, and higher economic growth in these
economies.
2.3.5 Empirical Model Specifications
Our empirical setting relies on the factor model specification of Dungey et al.
(2005) as shown in Eq. (2.8) and (2.9). The crisis first originated in the US
market and subsequently spread to other markets. We examine US contagion
effects in advanced economies and emerging economies separately to achieve exact
identification. In a five markets case, there are 15 moment conditions. We have
five λs and five δs. Therefore, we have a maximum of five contagion channels
which be identified with the model. In the actual empirical setting, we define
four contagion channels from the US to each of four other countries and we use
one additional parameter to check for a structural break in the US common factor.
Therefore, our empirical framework proceeds as follows:
yUS,t
y2,t
y3,t
y4,t
y5,t

=

λ1
λ2
λ3
λ4
λ5

[
wt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Common
+ diag

δ1
δ2
δ3
δ4
δ5


u1,t
u2,t
u3,t
u4,t
u5,t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Idiosyncratic
+

0
ϕ12 0
ϕ13 0
ϕ14 0
ϕ15 0

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︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contagion
+

λ0
0
0
0
0

[
Itwt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Break in Common
(2.16)
where I is an indicator function that takes value 1 during the crisis period, oth-
erwise 0. The loading matrix for the idiosyncratic factor in Eq. (2.16) can be
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altered for the possible contagion channels across the markets including feedback
to the US market but the choice of contagion channel is limited by number of
available moment conditions and number of parameters to be estimated.6 We use
the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach to estimate the parameters
in Eq. (2.16), matching the theoretical and empirical moment conditions.
For the non-crisis period, the variance-covariance structures of markets take
the same form as in Eq. (2.4) and (2.5). For the crisis period, the variance-
covariance structure of markets can be expressed as:
Variance of the US market:
E[y2US] = λ
2
1 + δ
2
1 + λ
2
0. (2.17)
Variance of other markets:
E[y2i ] = λ
2
i + δ
2
i + ϕ
2
1i; i = 2, ..., 5 6= US. (2.18)
Covariance between the US and each of other markets :
E[yUS, yi] = λ1λi + δ1ϕ1i; = 2, ..., 5 6= US. (2.19)
Covariance between other markets:
E[yi, yj] = λiλj + ϕ1iϕ1j; i = 2, ..., 5 ∀i 6= j 6= US. (2.20)
The non-crisis and crisis period variance-covariance conditions can be obtained
by introducing indicator function (I) in Eq. (2.17) to (2.20) as indicated in Eq.
(2.16).
We decompose the variance of each market as a proportion contribution of
each factor in Eq. (2.16) as specified in Eq. (2.12), (2.17) and (2.18). More specif-
6Our preliminary analysis of Granger Causality tests indicates that the US market is not
Granger caused by other markets.
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ically, for the non-crisis period, the proportion contributed by common factor for
each market (i) is given by:
λ2i /(λ
2
i + δ
2
i ) (2.21)
and the proportion contributed by idiosyncratic factor is given by:
δ2i /(λ
2
i + δ
2
i ). (2.22)
For the crisis period, for the US, the proportion contributed by common factor
is given by:
(λ21 + λ
2
0)/[(λ
2
1 + λ
2
0) + δ
2
1] (2.23)
and the proportion contributed by idiosyncratic factor is given by:
δ21/[(λ
2
1 + λ
2
0) + δ
2
1]. (2.24)
For other markets, the proportion contributed by common factor is given by:
λ2i /(λ
2
i + δ
2
i + ϕ
2
1,i); i = 2, ..., 5∀i 6= US (2.25)
the proportion contributed by idiosyncratic factor is given by:
δ2i /(λ
2
i + δ
2
i + ϕ
2
1,i) (2.26)
and the proportion contributed by contagion factor is given by:
ϕ21,i/(λ
2
i + δ
2
i + ϕ
2
1,i). (2.27)
The variance decomposition outlined above provides the relative strength of
each factor for a given market contributing to its market volatility.
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We test the overall significance of the model specified in Eq. (2.16) us-
ing Hansen’s J-test for a number of overidentification restrictions where the J-
statistic is:
J = TQ (2.28)
where T is the sample size, and Q is the value of objective value function of the
GMM estimator which takes of the form:
Q = M ′W−1M (2.29)
where M is a vector containing the difference between the empirical and the-
oretical moments and W is the optimal weighting matrix. The J-statistic is
distributed asymptotically χ2 with ϑ (number of restricted parameters) degrees
of freedom. Under the null hypothesis, the restrictions are set to be zero. If the
value of J statistic is below the χ2 critical value at 5 percent level of significance
for given level of degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis of “the model is valid
with restrictions” is accepted.
For a joint test of contagion using factor model in Eq. (2.16), we perform an
LR test with 4 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis (ϕ1,j = 0). This
test of contagion can be interpreted as testing for changes in both variances and
covariances (Dungey et al., 2005).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Model Restrictions and Statistical Significance
The model in Eq. (2.16) is exactly identified with 15 parameters and 15 moment
conditions. The framework allows for a single common factor, wt, across all the
assets, and this single time-varying factor is maintained across both the non-
crisis and crisis sample. To verify this specification we apply a Hall (2005, p.175)
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Table 2.3: Structural break test (Hall, 2005, p. 178)
Market France Germany Japan UK Brazil China India Russia
Panel A: Test for a single factor across both period
Aggregate equity market index
χ2(48) 0.314 0.516 0.128 0.304 0.300 0.262 0.308 0.311
p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Financial sector index
χ2(48) 0.249 0.343 0.133 0.219 0.248 0.401 0.336 0.297
p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Panel B: Test for a change in factor loadings
Aggregate equity market index
χ2(6) 81.809 69.150 54.563 92.556 57.595 49.385 56.025 33.281
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Financial sector index
χ2(6) 79.489 68.540 53.212 98.500 46.775 34.498 36.118 36.219
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
structural break test against the null of the single factor specification, shown in
Table 2.3. The test accepts the null that there is a single factor specification
across the two periods. A Hall test against the null of no change in the factor
loadings, however, is rejected for all of our markets, supporting our specification of
a single common factor across both periods, but allowing for changing parameter
loadings in the non-crisis and crisis periods.7
We further test the model by imposing restrictions on (i) contagion param-
eters and parameter for a break in the US common factor, (ϕ1,j = λ0 = 0); (ii)
parameter for a break in the US common factor (λ0 = 0) only; and (iii) contagion
parameters, (ϕ1,j = 0) only. We used Hansen’s J-test for overidentification when
restrictions were imposed. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 2.4.
The restrictions ϕ1,j = λ0 = 0 is rejected. However, the restriction λ0 =
0 is rejected only for models for advanced economies. The hypothesis is not
rejected for emerging economies. The statistical significance of the model with a
break in the US common factor for advanced economies indicates a shift in the
interdependence amongst advanced markets during the crisis. This is not the
7As supporting evidence we also conducted the Ghysels and Hall (1990) test of structural
change, where the null is that neither the model specification nor the parameter loadings have
changed between the two periods. This null is also rejected.
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Table 2.4: Model restrictions and statistical significance
Advanced Emerging
Model Restrictions Equity Financial Equity Financial
Panel A: J-test for overidentification
Unconstrained model J-stat 5.17 1.52 1.87 0.02
Model with restrictions (i) J-stat 45.98 56.88 51.91 39.49
(ϕ1,j = 0, λ0 = 0) dof 5 5 5 5
Model with restrictions (ii) J-stat 6.16 8.17 1.87 0.03
(λ0 = 0) dof 1 1 1 1
Model with restrictions (iii) J-stat 45.98 56.89 51.91 39.49
(ϕ1,j = 0) dof 4 4 4 4
Panel B: LR test for models comparison
Model constrains (ϕ1,j = 0) LR-stat 81.62 110.73 100.08 78.93
dof 4 4 4 4
Note: In J-test, H0 : the model with restriction is valid.
At α = 5%, χ2(1) = 5.024; χ
2
(4) = 11.14; χ
2
(5) = 12.83; and χ
2
(10) = 20.48
case with emerging markets, where we do not find changes in interdependence.
The restriction ϕ1,j = 0 is rejected. This test suggests that model estimation
without contagion parameters may suffer from misspecification. As this test also
approximates the test for a joint hypothesis of no contagion, the rejection of the
null hypothesis suggests evidence of significant contagion running from the US
to other markets during the global financial crisis. When a formal LR test is
performed for a joint test of statistical significance of the contagion parameter
estimates (ϕ1,j = 0) in Eq. (2.16), we reject the null hypothesis providing statis-
tical evidence of financial contagion in advanced and emerging markets (running
from the US market) during the GFC. The result is reported in Panel B of Table
2.3.
2.4.2 Measuring Contagion Effects - Volatility Decomposi-
tion
The unconditional volatility decomposition estimates for total equity market re-
turns from the latent factor model for the US and the four advanced and four
emerging economies are presented in Table 2.5. During the non-crisis period,
the common factor explains a large portion of equity market volatility for ad-
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Table 2.5: Unconditional volatility decomposition of aggregate equity market
returns (contribution to total volatility, in percent)
Country
Crisis Period Non-crisis Period
Common Idiosyncratic Contagion Common Idiosyncratic
Factor Factor from US Factor Factor
Panel A: Contagion Effect from US to Advanced Economies
US 54.25 45.75 37.22 62.78
France 26.74 0.70 72.55 97.44 2.56
Germany 17.41 5.98 76.61 74.44 25.56
Japan 27.07 53.79 19.15 33.48 66.52
UK 27.35 7.51 65.14 78.46 21.54
Panel B: Contagion Effect from US to Emerging Economies
US 60.82 39.18 59.62 40.38
Brazil 53.36 25.39 21.24 67.76 32.24
China 0.67 70.77 28.57 0.94 99.06
India 0.01 14.56 85.43 0.03 99.97
Russia 0.73 42.63 56.64 1.67 98.33
vanced economies, particularly amongst the European countries. This could be
due to the fact that the European countries have similar institutional frameworks
to the European Union and therefore markets are more integrated. The results
for the crisis period show that the common factor accounts for about 54 per-
cent of the US equity market, about 27 percent (each) of the French, Japanese
and British equity markets, and about 17 percent for the German equity market.
The country-specific idiosyncratic factors contribute less to the volatility (except
for Japan), suggesting less benefit from portfolio diversification for international
investors.
During the crisis period, contagion factors are dominant in explaining the
volatility of the French, German and British equity markets. The contagion
effects running from the US alone explain about 73 percent of the volatility of the
French, 77 percent of the volatility of the German and 65 percent of the volatility
of the British equity markets. The greater contagion effects in European equity
markets can be attributed to panic amongst investors about the effect of the US
crisis (in terms of size and influences) on European markets.
Amongst the advanced countries, the Japanese equity market experienced the
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least contagion effects from the US equity market (US shocks explain about 19
percent of the volatility of the Japanese equity market). Wei (2009) argues that
during the crisis period Japanese markets were facing economic problems and a
natural disaster (typhoon) and the Japanese media were focusing on those issues
rather than the crisis in the US. Within-country attention in Japanese markets
is also reflected in the contribution of the country-specific idiosyncratic factor to
total equity market volatility (the idiosyncratic factor explains about 54 percent
of the volatility of the Japanese equity market).
In the case of emerging markets, the common factor accounts for much less
observed volatility in these markets, except Brazil. The emerging markets inves-
tigated in general have very different institutional settings, which may contribute
to lower commonality in terms of equity market returns. However, in the case of
Brazil, there is a relatively high degree of commonality with the US, at almost
68 percent in the non-crisis period and 53 percent in the crisis period. Unlike
the other BRICs, the US and Brazil share a common region, which may account
for some of this aspect. During the crisis period, the contribution of idiosyn-
cratic shocks from the US to Brazilian volatility accounts for some 21 percent of
observed volatility, where these represent transmissions that are statistically dif-
ferentiated from those due to the commonality already accounted for in the model.
The difference in results between the US and Brazil from the other BRICs is also
supported by Aloui et al. (2011), who find a strong, symmetric tail dependence
between the US and Brazil, but relatively little between the US and Russia, India
and China. Aloui et al. (2011) also find that the linkages between the US and
Brazil and the US and Russia are stronger than those between the US and China
and the US and India, which is consistent with our results, although our Russian
evidence is less compelling than in their paper. Dungey et al. (2011) also found
evidence of contagion to Russia and Brazil in earlier crises.
The results for contagion effects from the US equity markets to emerging
markets indicate that Brazilian and Chinese equity markets experience lower
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contagion effects from the US than other emerging markets in our sample. The
US shocks explain about 21 and 29 percent of the volatility of these markets
respectively. The Chinese equity market is well-known to be less globally inte-
grated than others in our study. Wang and Di Iorio (2007) support this, while
Girardin and Liu (2007), for example, show that post-1996, the Chinese equity
market is less integrated with the US than previously due to the rise of its rela-
tionship with the Hang Seng. When a market is not well integrated this supports
a high idiosyncratic factor in the results – which is exactly what we see for China.
Given that this is evidence of a new international sensitivity in a relatively closed
market, it does not seem an unexpected result that the contagion component in
China should be lower than in other countries.
Our results also show that US shocks explain about 57 percent of the Russian
market volatility. Hwang et al. (2013) also find evidence for linkages between the
US and Russia, although they classify these as herding behaviour, which they
characterize as a precursor to contagion. In contrast with the results in Aloui
et al. (2011), but supported by Hwang et al. (2013), the evidence for contagion
effects to India is relatively strong.
The country-specific idiosyncratic shocks explain a large portion of the volatil-
ity of these markets, in particular the Chinese and Russian equity markets, even
during the crisis period. Within-country idiosyncrasies explain about 43 percent
of Russian equity market volatility and about 71 percent for Chinese equity mar-
kets. The distinct political economy of these countries, which is less aligned with
advanced open economies, could be a possible explanation for the high level of
within-country idiosyncrasies. These results suggest that the benefits from in-
ternational portfolio diversification in these countries exist even during the crisis
period.
During the global financial crisis the financial sector was the first and most
affected segment of the economy. However, Table 2.6 shows that the contagion
effects from the US financial sector to the other advanced economies in the sample
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Table 2.6: Unconditional volatility decomposition of financial sector index returns
(contribution to total volatility, in percent)
Country
Crisis Period Non-crisis Period
Common Idiosyncratic Contagion Common Idiosyncratic
Factor Factor from US Factor Factor
Panel A: Contagion Effect from US to Advanced Economies
US 18.45 81.55 10.16 89.84
France 90.58 5.52 3.91 94.26 5.74
Germany 76.04 18.24 5.72 80.65 19.35
Japan 6.26 23.35 70.39 21.14 78.86
UK 79.94 18.50 1.56 81.21 18.79
Panel B: Contagion Effect from US to Emerging Economies
US 80.89 19.11 4.33 95.67
Brazil 52.06 23.30 24.64 69.08 30.92
China 0.40 68.24 31.35 0.58 99.42
India 0.02 26.26 73.72 0.07 99.93
Russia 0.03 45.04 54.93 0.07 99.93
(except Japan) are not large, particularly when compared to the overall equity
market linkages reported in Table 2.5. The US financial sector shocks explain
about 4 percent of the volatility in the French financial sector, 6 percent in the
German financial sector and 2 percent in the UK financial sector. The reasons for
this dramatic difference between these and the overall equity market linkages seem
likely to lie with the literature on the role of financial integration and business
cycle synchronization. Financial sectors in the advanced economies are known to
be strongly integrated (Bekaert et al., 2009). Although the theoretical literature
debates whether financial integration and output cycles are positively correlated,
recently Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) provided empirical evidence that financially
integrated markets may have less correlated output during non- crisis periods,
but that during periods of financial stress output correlation will increase. And
further, global banking linkages have a significant role to play in this feature.
The evidence presented in Tables 5 and 6 is consistent with these findings. The
transmission of contagion, which accounts for increased correlation over that nor-
mally observed in the markets, is higher for the index which includes the effects
on the real economy than in just the financial sector. The financial sector here
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is not experiencing much increase in transmission above what would normally be
expected (the contribution of the common factor has not altered substantially).
Unlike the other advanced economies, the Japanese financial sector experi-
ences large shocks from the US financial sector despite evidence that the Japanese
financial system is assumed to be resilient to external influences (IMF, 2009a;
Kawai and Takagi, 2009).8 The literature suggests that during the early phase of
the GFC, the Japanese financial system was in fact robust to the global market
turmoil, but the aftershocks of the Lehman Brothers collapse increased the uncer-
tainty in the market and destabilized the Japanese financial system (IMF, 2008,
2009). Consistent with the results in this paper, the IMF (2008) attributes the
increased uncertainty in the Japanese financial markets to the global repricing of
risk rather than domestic concerns.
The contagion effects of the US financial sector in emerging markets are sim-
ilar to those in the overall equity market. Shocks from the US financial sector
explain about one quarter of Brazilian financial sector volatility and about one
third of Chinese financial sector volatility. The Indian financial sector experiences
more contagion effects. The US financial sector shocks explain about 74 percent
of the volatility during the crisis period. This evidence that the contagion ef-
fects measured using the financial index do not differ much from those using the
entire index is consistent with the arguments previously invoked about the role
of financial integration during crises. These emerging markets are not strongly
integrated, meaning that during the financial crisis they did not suffer from as
much increase in their real economy correlation as the more integrated advanced
markets following the evidence of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013).
We transform the results in Table 2.5 and 2.6 into their squared basis point
equivalent by multiplying these results by the variance on the returns on mar-
8During the earlier episodes of financial crises, particularly the Asian crisis of 1997, despite
its close proximity to other Asian countries experiencing severe financial crisis (e.g. Indonesia,
Korea, Thailand), the Japanese financial system experienced less or no contagion effects (Chiang
et al., 2007; Chiang and Zheng, 2010).
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ket index for each country. The estimated variance decompositions in squared
basis points are reported in Table 2.7. This transformation of results quantifies
the contagion effects in a meaningful way. For example, the US shocks explain
70 percent of the volatility of the Japanese financial sector returns and about
74 percent of the volatility of the Indian financial sector return. However, the
magnitude of the effects on squared basis points in the Indian financial sector is
about twice the effects on the Japanese financial sector.
In squared basis points, the US contagion contributes to the increase in the
variance of the UK equity market by 3.961 squared basis points, which is the most
amongst the advanced equity markets. The US contagion shocks contribute to
the variance of the Japanese equity market by 0.785 square basis points. Amongst
the emerging equity markets, the US contagion shocks contribute to a large in-
crease in the variance of these markets, particularly in the Indian and Russian
markets. The magnitude of contagion shocks in squared basis points is greater
for the Russian equity market than for the Indian equity market, although the
US contagion shocks explain a larger proportion of the Indian equity market
volatility than the Russian equity market volatility, as shown in Table 2.5. The
results suggest that the US contagion shocks increase the variance of the Russian
equity market in greater scale than that of the Indian equity market. Similarly,
the US shocks increase the volatility of the Brazilian equity market more than
that of the Japanese market (2.341 versus 0.785 squared basis points), although
the proportion of the contribution of US shocks in the Japanese equity market is
higher than in the Brazilian equity market.
In the financial sectors, the contagion from the US financial sector accounts
for about 5.5 square basis points in the total variance of the Japanese financial
market. The square point basis contribution of US financial sector shocks is higher
for emerging financial sectors. For example, the US shocks account for about 11.5
square basis points for the variance in the Indian financial sector returns and
about 10.4 square basis points for the variance in the Russian financial sector
2 Equity Market Contagion during the Global Financial Crisis 37
Ta
bl
e
2.
7:
U
nc
on
di
ti
on
al
vo
la
ti
lit
y
de
co
m
po
si
ti
on
(e
xp
re
ss
ed
in
sq
ua
re
d
re
tu
rn
s)
E
qu
ity
M
ar
ke
t
F
in
an
ci
al
Se
ct
or
s
C
ou
nt
ry
C
om
m
on
Id
io
sy
nc
C
on
ta
gi
on
To
ta
l
C
om
m
on
Id
io
sy
nc
C
on
ta
gi
on
To
ta
l
fa
ct
or
fa
ct
or
fr
om
U
S
fa
ct
or
fa
ct
or
fr
om
U
S
P
an
el
A
:
A
dv
an
ce
d
ec
on
om
ie
s
U
S
2.
63
8
2.
22
5
0.
00
0
4.
86
3
2.
62
6
11
.6
04
0.
00
0
14
.2
29
Fr
an
ce
1.
42
5
0.
03
7
3.
86
5
5.
32
7
9.
04
7
0.
55
1
0.
39
0
9.
98
7
G
er
m
an
y
0.
82
9
0.
28
5
3.
64
8
4.
76
2
5.
13
7
1.
23
2
0.
38
7
6.
75
6
Ja
pa
n
1.
11
0
2.
20
6
0.
78
5
4.
10
2
0.
48
9
1.
82
3
5.
49
7
7.
80
9
U
K
1.
66
3
0.
45
7
3.
96
0
6.
08
0
9.
18
7
2.
12
6
0.
17
9
11
.4
93
P
an
el
B
:
U
S
an
d
E
m
er
gi
ng
ec
on
om
ie
s
U
S
2.
95
7
1.
90
6
0.
00
0
4.
86
3
11
.5
11
2.
71
9
0.
00
0
14
.2
29
B
ra
zi
l
5.
88
2
2.
79
8
2.
34
1
11
.0
22
6.
18
0
2.
76
6
2.
92
5
11
.8
71
C
hi
na
0.
04
0
4.
26
4
1.
72
1
6.
02
6
0.
02
9
4.
91
7
2.
25
9
7.
20
5
In
di
a
0.
00
0
1.
13
8
6.
67
0
7.
80
8
0.
00
2
3.
51
6
9.
87
3
13
.3
91
R
us
si
a
0.
09
4
5.
50
6
7.
31
5
12
.9
15
0.
00
6
8.
23
9
10
.0
47
18
.2
92
2 Equity Market Contagion during the Global Financial Crisis 38
returns.
2.4.3 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of Results
We also examined contagion from the US financial sector to the aggregate eq-
uity markets in other countries and contagion from the US equity market to the
financial sector of other markets. The results are consistent, i.e. the financial
markets in advanced countries (except Japan) experience very small contagion
effects from the US (equity market or financial sector). In addition, we consid-
ered September 15, 2008 to May 29, 2009 as the crisis period. We also performed
the sensitivity analysis for geographic time differences considering (i) data as it
is, that is, without time adjustment, and (ii) using the 2-day rolling over moving
average (as in Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). The central results remain the same.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
The global financial crisis has been widely characterized as beginning with the real
estate bubble burst and sub-prime crisis in the US. This was followed by a sharp
decline in equity market indices in the US and subsequently in other countries.
The crisis was not limited to advanced economies. Many emerging economies ex-
perienced even sharper decreases in stock market indices. This paper examined
the contagion effects from the US to advanced and emerging economies during
the global financial crisis using a latent factor model. We found significant con-
tagion effects from the US equity market to equity markets in both advanced
and emerging economies. The contagion factors were the dominant factors ex-
plaining the volatility of these markets during the crisis period. However, we
found less contagion effects from the US financial sector to the financial sector of
advanced economies except Japan. Our results suggest that contagion effects are
not strongly related to the level of global integration.
Our results point to several interesting areas for future research. One avenue
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might be identifying the explicit pathways of transmission (e.g. trade and finan-
cial linkages and interbank networks) of the crisis effects such as in Glick and
Rose (1999), van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001, 2003), Rose and Spiegel (2010)
and Park and Song (2001). Another interesting avenue for additional research is
to study the potential causes of contagion. A broader understanding of poten-
tial channels of crisis transmission including contagion might hold greater policy
significance during a time of financial turmoil.
Chapter 3
Identifying Contagion Using a
Conditional Factor Model
3.1 Introduction
Financial contagion is a crisis phenomenon associated with higher market volatil-
ity and stronger comovement of markets than normal periods. Empirical ap-
proaches measuring financial contagion largely focus on quantifying this comove-
ment of markets during highly volatile periods and rely on correlation measures
such as correlation coefficients or beta coefficients (Bekaert et al., 2005; Dungey
et al., 2005; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Hwang et al., 2013; Kasch and Caporin,
2013). A limitation of the conventional correlation measure is that it tends to
be biased upwards when series experience high volatility (Forbes and Rigobon,
2002). Polson and Scott (2011) suggest that in a market model framework an
illusion of excess correlation may arise if we ignore time varying volatility because
cross-market correlations are conditional upon the aggregate market volatility.
A number of authors have attempted to correct for this bias while testing for
contagion. For example, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest adjusting for the
upward bias in cross-market correlation by considering the increased volatility
of the source market during the crisis period, while Corsetti et al. (2005) offer
40
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an adjustment to the correlation coefficient based on the changes in the vari-
ance ratios of common and idiosyncratic factors during the crisis period. The
possible drawbacks of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach are (i) it often
underestimates the adjusted correlation coefficient and (ii) the true underlying
relationship may experience a break or shift during the crisis period because of
some policy initiatives. The Corsetti et al. (2005) approach relaxes the assump-
tion of a constant underlying relationship between two markets but assumes that
the variance within sub-sample periods remains constant - which is not necessar-
ily true. Dungey and Renault (2013) offer a latent factor volatility model which
accounts for heteroskedasticity and considers the potential source of contagion
through a common factor or systematic risk.
In this chapter, we apply the Dungey and Renault (2013) model and adjusted
correlation approach of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and re-examine financial con-
tagion in equity markets for advanced and emerging economies for the global fi-
nancial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. Applying the approach of Dungey and Renault
(2013) we more specifically test for a change in common factor loading during the
crisis period. In this sense, contagion here refers to ‘fundamentals based conta-
gion’ (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998). The results reveal that most of the sample
aggregate equity markets experienced significant change in their structural rela-
tionship with the US aggregate equity market suggesting contagion through the
systematic channel. However, the structural relationship between the US financial
sector and the financial sectors of other economies has broken completely during
the crisis period, indicating the potential for policy initiatives, such as restrictions
on cross-border merger, to shield domestic financial sectors from crisis in the US
financial sector. Interestingly, when we apply the adjusted correlation coefficient
approach of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we observe that the adjusted correlation
coefficient between US and other sample market decreases significantly during
the crisis period.
This chapter contributes to the growing body of literature on global financial
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crisis and contagion effects and is closely related to Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
However, this chapter differs in three major aspects. First, the way we define
contagion is different - this chapter focuses on fundamentals based contagion
or systematic contagion whereas Chapter 2 focuses on idiosyncratic contagion.
Second, this chapter uses a conditional factor volatility model whereas Chapter
2 is based on an unconditional factor model. Finally, this chapter incorporates
heteroskedasticity issue in data whereas Chapter 2 assumes homoscedasticity.
The results from this chapter contribute to our understanding on different aspects
of financial contagion during the GFC.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model-
ing framework for contagion tests including a description of the conditional factor
model of Dungey and Renault (2013). Section 3.3 describes the sample, data and
empirical implementation of the conditional factor model. Results and discussion
are presented in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
3.2 The Modeling Framework
3.2.1 Motivation
There are several issues with identifying financial contagion empirically, particu-
larly in the correlation based approach. The most difficult of these is related to
the issue of time-varying volatility.
Suppose that one has specified the relationship between two markets (x and
y) in a bivariate regression framework as follows:
yt = α + βxt + t (3.1)
where E[t] = 0, E[2t ] = c <∞(where c is a constant), and E[xtt] = 0. Consider
a normal period (l) which is likely to be less volatile, a crisis period (h) which
is likely to be more volatile, and assume that the underlying relation between
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two markets remains constant in both normal and crisis periods, that is, βh = βl
which implies:
βh =
Cov[x, y]h
V ar[x]h
=
Cov[x, y]l
V ar[x]l
= βl. (3.2)
By construction, V ar[x]h > V ar[x]l, which implies that Cov[x, y]h > Cov[x, y]l.
The second order moment condition for Eq. (3.1) can be expressed as
V ar[y] = β2V ar[x] + V ar[]. (3.3)
Since the variance of the residual is positive, the increase in the variance of y
across periods is less than proportional to the increase in the variance of x (see
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) for further details and proof). In other words,
(
V ar[x]
V ar[y]
)h
>
(
V ar[x]
V ar[y]
)l
. (3.4)
Now, consider the standard definition of the correlation coefficient (ρ):
ρxy =
Cov[x, y]√
V ar[x]V ar[y]
= β
√
V ar[x]
V ar[y]
. (3.5)
When we substitute Eq. (3.2) into Eq. (3.5) and consider the relationship ex-
pressed in Eq. (3.4), we obtain
ρhxy > ρ
l
xy. (3.6)
Therefore, Eq. (3.6) implies that the estimated correlation between x and
y increases when the variance in x increases. Therefore, ignoring the effect of
time-varying volatility can lead to spurious findings of excess correlation.
The Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach tests for a significant difference
between the unconditional correlation coefficient (after adjusting for increased
variance) during a crisis period and the correlation coefficient during a non-crisis
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period. The crisis period unconditional correlation coefficient is given as:
ρ˜hxy =
ρhxy√
1 + δ
[
1− (ρhxy)2] , (3.7)
where δ =
[
V ar[x]h − V ar[x]l] /V ar[x]l, the proportional change in variance dur-
ing the crisis period. Therefore, the null hypothesis is:
H0 : ρ˜
h
xy = ρ
l
xy (3.8)
against the alternative hypothesis of:
H1 : ρ˜
h
xy > ρ
l
xy (3.9)
A rejection of the H0 is consistent with the presence of contagion.1 Considering
the finite sample properties of financial data and the fact that the correlation
coefficient is bounded between +1 to -1, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest
using Fisher’s transformation where the resulting t-stat is given by:
1
2
ln
(
1+ρ˜hxy
1−ρ˜hxy
)
− 1
2
ln
(
1+ρlxy
1−ρlxy
)
√
1
T1−3 +
1
T2−3
(3.12)
where T1 and T2 refer to pre-crisis and crisis periods respectively.
A limitation to the correlation coefficient approach of Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) even with this correction, is that it assumes constant variance within sub-
sample periods which is less likely in the case of financial return series.
Dungey et al. (2005) show that the variance adjustment in the correlation
1In their actual empirical setting, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) test the following hypotheses:
H0 : ρxy > ρ˜
h
xy (3.10)
H1 : ρxy ≤ ρ˜hxy (3.11)
where ρxy is the correlation coefficient based on full sample period indicating that any t-test
value greater than t-test critical value at 5 percent indicates evidence of contagion while any
t-test value less or equals to critical value indicates no contagion.
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coefficient can be equivalently implemented in a regression framework such as
Eq.(3.1) for the crisis period as
yht = α + β˜
hx˜ht + 
h
t (3.13)
where
x˜ht = x
h
t /
√
(1 + δρ˜hxy)/(1 + δ); t = (1, ..., T2) ∈ T2. (3.14)
The test of contagion equivalent to Eq. (3.8) is:
H0 : β˜
h = βl. (3.15)
Dungey and Renault (2013) argue that Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach
of adjustment in correlation coefficient may overestimate the spurious component
of correlation increase so that their proposed test tends towards an erroneous con-
clusion of “no contagion”. This is the most likely case when the volatility of the
recipient market, y, increases more than the volatility of the source market, x,
during the crisis period.2 Considering this heteroskedasticity issue and potential
time varying structural relationship between crisis originating market and recip-
ient markets, Dungey and Renault (2013) propose a conditional factor model.
3.2.2 The Conditional Factor Model3
Consider a simple latent factor model of asset pricing where the return on risky
assets (r1, r2, ..., rn) is a function of a common factor and can be represented as:
ri,t+1 = λiFt+1 + εi,t+1 i = 1, ..., n (3.16)
2To overcome the heteroskedasticity issue, some recent studies compute the conditional
correlation from dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) GARCH approach (Engle, 2002) and
test for a significant increase in conditional correlation during the crisis period (Chiang et al.,
2007; Wang and Nguyen Thi, 2012), under the null hypothesis of no contagion, ρy(DCC) =
ρx(DCC). The DCC approach overcomes the endogeneity issue in the Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
approach by computing the conditional correlation coefficient from GARCH model residuals.
3This section is largely drawn from Dungey and Renault (2013).
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where ri,t+1, Ft+1 and εi,t+1 are the excess return of risky asset i, the common
factor, and the model residual respectively, and all of which have a zero condi-
tional expectation at time t. λi is the factor loading of asset i. Dungey and
Renault (2013) show multiple factors are possible but in practice most financial
data confirms the existence of one common factor.
Eq.(3.16) can be identified through the structure of conditional moment con-
ditions given by
Covt[Ft+1, εi,t+1] = 0, i = 1, ..., n (3.17)
Covt[εi,t+1, εj,t+1] = ωi,j, i, j = 1, ..., n. (3.18)
Eq.(3.17) and (3.18) suggest that the conditional variance of the common factor
is the only source of time variation of conditional variances and covariances of
asset returns (Dungey and Renault, 2013).
To characterize financial contagion within such a factor model, consider the
asset return on the crisis originating country, rn, as a mimicking factor, then
ri,t+1 = birn,t+1 + εi,t+1; i = 1, ..., n− 1 (3.19)
where a structural break in the coefficient bi for the crisis period can be considered
as evidence of contagion. As covered in Section 3.2.1, ignoring the potential
changes in variance of rn over time may result in spurious changes in bi during
the crisis period. To overcome this issue, Dungey and Renault (2013) suggest
that expressing the data generating process of the mimicking asset return as:
rn,t+1 = Ft+1 + εn,t+1 (3.20)
with variance
V ar(rn,t+1) = V ar(Ft+1) + V ar(εn,t+1). (3.21)
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and
V ar(Ft+1) = αV ar(rn,t+1). (3.22)
The choice of normalization constant α is limited by the constraint to ensure
positivity:
α ≥ 1− MinV art(rn,t+1)
V ar(rn,t+1)
= α¯ (3.23)
whereMinV art(rn,t+1) is the minimum of V art(rn,t+1). Since theE[V art(rn,t+1)]=
V ar(rn,t+1), we have 1 > α¯ ≥ 0, indicating that the return (rn,t+1) is conditionally
heteroskedastic (Dungey and Renault, 2013). Assigning α¯V ar(rn,t+1) amount of
variance to the factor captures the time varying part of the conditional variance
(Dungey and Renault, 2013). The normalization parameter α can be derived from
a univariate GARCH process, where the implied conditional variance path pro-
vides MinV art(rn,t+1), and the unconditional variance from the sample provides
V ar(rn,t+1). Eq. (3.22), which hence implies that if the unconditional variance of
the mimicking asset, rn, increases, the variance of common factor should increase
in the same ratio to keep the underlying relation between them unchanged.
Dungey and Renault (2013) suggest the generalized method of moments (GMM)
to estimate the parameters of the model, where the moment condition restrictions
are:
Et[rj,t+1(ri,t+1 − birn,t+1)] = cij, j=1,...,n;i=1,...,n−1 (3.24)
and
E[ri,trn,t − biαr2n,t−1 − wi,n] = 0. (3.25)
where (bi, cij, win) are the unknown parameters. Eq. (3.24) is the conditional
moment restriction whereas Eq. (3.25) is the unconditional moment restriction.
In a GMM framework, these moment restrictions are implemented via an
(n + 1) vector of instruments zt = [1, r1,t, r2,t, ..., rn,t]′. The estimation of Eq.
(3.24) for a vector of returns ri and instruments can be written as:
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ri,t+1[rt+1 ⊗ zt]︸ ︷︷ ︸ = bi [rn,t+1 ⊗ (rt+1 ⊗ zt)] + ci [In ⊗ zt]︸ ︷︷ ︸ +ui,t+1
Yi,t+1 Xt+1θi
(3.26)
where rt+1 is a set of n assets which yields n(n+ 1) column matrix for [rt+1⊗ zt],
the notation ⊗ denotes Kronecker product, In is the identity matrix of dimension
n, ui is residual and θi = {bi, ci} contains unknown parameters of interest. The
unconditional moment restriction
E[ui,t+1] = 0 (3.27)
helps to identify these unknown parameters in Eq. (3.26). Starting values for
parameters are obtained by running ordinary least square (OLS) in the univariate
regression by averaging Eq. (3.26) over time, that is:
θi,T (OLS) =
[
XTX
′
T
]−1
X
′
TY i,T (3.28)
where Y and X refer to average over time, t=1,...,T .
Eq. (3.26) does not take into account the arguments provided in Eq. (3.20)-
(3.22). As shown in Dungey and Renault (2013), the extension of Eq. (3.26)
considering Eq. (3.22) can be written as:

ri,t+1[rt+1 ⊗ zt]
ri,t+1rn,t+1
rn,t+1  rn,t+1
 =

bi [rn,t+1 ⊗ (rt+1 ⊗ zt)] + ci [In ⊗ zt]
bi [e⊗ (α rn,t+1  rn,t+1)] + wi
(1− α)−1wn
+

u˜iz,t+1
u˜in,t+1
u˜nn,t+1

(3.29)
or
Y˜i,t+1 = X˜t+1θ˜i + u˜i,t+1 (3.30)
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where  refers to component-wise product, or Hadamard product, e is a vector
of ones and θi = [bi, ci, wi, wn]. The first row in Eq.(3.29) is same as in Eq.(3.26).
The second and third rows in Eq. (3.29) add the linear expression of covariance
and variance. Now, the parameters of interest can be estimated with the moment
restrictions specified in Eq. (3.24), (3.25) and (3.27).
3.3 Sample, Data and Empirical Implementation
3.3.1 Sample and Data
We consider the daily returns for the aggregate equity market and financial sec-
tor of the 9 largest economies in terms of gross domestic product (5 advanced
countries: France, Germany, Japan, UK, and the US; and 4 emerging economies:
Brazil, China, India and Russia) considering the the US as a crisis origin country.
The sample period is from August 2, 2004 to May 30, 2009 with corresponding
crisis period from July 19, 2007 to May 30, 2009, as identified in Chapter Two.
We extract the daily data for the aggregate equity market index and financial
sector index from Thompson Reuters Datastream.
3.3.2 Empirical Implementation
As suggested in Dungey and Renault (2013), we estimate the normalization pa-
rameter α from a univariate GARCH(1,1) process applied to the US aggregate
equity index returns data, as it is a mimicking factor in our model. The estimated
value of α is 0.87. We also performed sensitivity analysis for different values of
α[= 0.6, 0.7, 0.9]. In our sample, we have a total of 9 assets (n = 9) representing
9 equity indices. Returns on the US equity market index provide our mimicking
factor, rn, and is consistent with literature that the US index can proxy for the
common factor or global factor (Bekaert et al., 2005, 2014).
We choose a constant and squared lagged returns as instruments. As we
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have 9 assets we choose 10 (= n + 1) instruments [zt = (1, r21,t, ..., r210,t)]. As we
perform asset-by-asset estimation, for a pre-crisis period, T1 and crisis period, T2
(where T1 + T2 = T ), for each Yi,t+1 we have 90 (= n(n + 1)) columns. Over
each estimation window, we compute Yi, for each day (t) and average it over the
estimation window. Doing this provides 90 mean observations for Y and 1 mean
observation for (ri, rn), the second row of Eq.(3.29).4 The estimation of X˜t+1
follows a similar process. The GMM estimates for θi,T can be estimated as:
θ˜i,T,GMM =
[
X˜T
(
Σ˜i,T
)−1
X˜
′
T
]−1
X˜
′
T
(
Σ˜i,T
)−1
Y˜ i,T (3.31)
where
(
Σ˜i,T
)
is the OLS consistent estimator of the covariance matrix:
Σ˜i,T =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(u˜i(θ,OLS))(u˜i(θ,OLS))
′ (3.32)
and works as a weighting matrix in Eq.(3.31). As suggested in Dungey and
Renault (2013), we choose 5-day rolling moving averages for rn to correct for
serial correlation.
Considering contagion as a crisis phenomenon, we split the sample period into
a pre-crisis period (T1) and crisis period (T2), and implement the factor model.
The test of contagion for asset i = 1, ..., n − 1 therefore refers to significant
differences between θ˜i,T1,GMM and θ˜i,T2,GMM , in particular bi,T1 and bi,T2, where
the standalone statistical significance of bi,T1 and bi,T2 indicates an underlying
structural relationship between asset i and the mimicking factor.
We also implement the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach in Eq.(3.8) and
(3.15), and test for contagion in our sample markets.
4The third row of Y˜i,t+1will have a constant term in right hand side so does not enter into
the estimation process.
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3.4 Results
Table 1 provides the results for tests of contagion in our sample. Panel A of Table
3.1 provides the pairwise correlation coefficient between US equity market returns
and the equity market returns for other sample countries. Amongst the sample
markets, a distinct pattern of comovement with the US equity markets is clearly
evident. Most of the advanced equity markets (except for Japan) have a high
degree of correlation with the US equity market suggesting a high level of equity
market integration in advanced countries (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Bekaert
et al., 2005). The emerging equity markets (except for Brazil), however have a
comparatively low level of correlation with the US equity market indicating low
level of market integration. The results for Brazil however suggest a high level
of regional integration of the Brazilian equity market with the US equity market.
The Chinese equity market has the lowest level of market comovement with the
US equity market in the sample.
The unconditional correlation coefficient for all the markets in sample (except
China) increased significantly during the crisis period as shown in the row labeled
‘t-test naive’ in Panel A of Table 3.1. However, when adjusted for heteroskedas-
ticity as suggested in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) shown in the row labeled ‘t-test
corrected’, the crisis period coefficient decreases significantly for all the markets
(except China). The correlation coefficients for China are insignificantly different
using both measures. If we consider the one-tail test of significant increase in
correlation during the crisis period as evidence for contagion (as in Forbes and
Rigobon (2002)), the null of no contagion could not be rejected.5
Results from the regression based approach of Dungey et al. (2005) are re-
ported in Panel B of Table 3.1. The results are similar to results reported in Panel
5However, considering decreased correlation against evidence of contagion may be mislead-
ing. The literature suggests that a crisis may have spillover effects in other countries, therefore,
policy makers of other countries may impose restrictions to reduce the crisis effect originated
elsewhere. In such cases magnitude of comovement of these two markets may reduce. Similarly,
when policy makers impose restrictions to reduce crisis effects it may systematically distort the
existing comovement (linkages) of markets which may lead to decrease in correlation.
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A. However, the unconditional regression coefficients for the crisis period are gen-
erally smaller than the coefficients for the crisis period and the heteroskedasticity
corrected regression coefficients for crisis period are even smaller. The signifi-
cant change in the regression coefficient for the crisis period suggests that the
underlying relationship between the two markets has changed during the crisis
period.
The results from the conditional factor model of Dungey and Renault (2013)
are reported in Panel C, D and E of Table 3.1. Panel C reports the J-test results
under the null of a single factor specification across pre-crisis and crisis periods.
The results suggest that a single factor model captures the dynamics of the data
generating process for each period in our sample. We test for structural stability
using a Hall (2005) test against the null of no break in the factor loadings in
Panel D. The null hypothesis is rejected for all of our sample markets, supporting
our specification of a single factor across both periods, but allowing for a break
in factor loadings in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. These results are further
supported by Ghysels and Hall (1990) test of structural change where the joint
null of no changes in either the model specification or the parameter loadings
between the two periods is rejected in all the countries except China and Japan.6
The factor loadings for all the sample equity markets are significant for both
pre-crisis and crisis periods with the exception of the Russian equity market where
the factor loading for the crisis period is not statistically significant at conven-
tional levels, as shown in Panel E of Table 3.1. These statistically significant
results suggest that the mimicking asset (aggregate US equity market returns)
can explain the returns of other sample markets - both advanced and emerging
in both pre-crisis and crisis periods. When we perform a test for significant dif-
ference between pre-crisis and crisis periods loadings, the null of no difference
is rejected for all the sample markets. As we are using the US equity market
return as a mimicking factor, the significant difference in common factor loadings
6The results for Brazil and India are marginally significant (at 11 percent).
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provides evidence for contagion from the US to other markets during the GFC.
More specifically this result suggests transmission of crisis through a common
factor. The established relationship between the US equity market and equity
markets of other sample countries has changed but not broken completely during
the crisis period. Consistent with these results, Fratzscher (2012) shows that the
common shock effects through capital flows (or portfolio re-balancing) affected
both emerging and advanced economies during the GFC. Zhang et al. (2013) also
provide evidence of change in comovement between the US equity market and
equity markets of emerging economies during the GFC.
Chapter 2 provides less evidence of contagion in the financial sector than in
aggregate equity market. We apply the conditional factor model to the finan-
cial sector of sample countries and re-examine the contagion effects. The results
are provided in Panel A through E of Table 3.2. Although the results using
correlation coefficients and the regression approach are similar to results for ag-
gregate equity markets, the results from the single factor model are interesting.
For the pre-crisis period, factor loadings are positive and statistically significant.
However, during the crisis period, the factor loadings are not statistically signifi-
cant (except for Germany) indicating that the US financial sector returns as the
mimicking portfolio is not able to explain the returns on other sample countries’
financial sectors. There are a number of possible reasons behind not finding a
significant coefficient for crisis period. Most of the policy initiatives and market
interventions focused on financial sectors, particularly designed to insulate the
domestic economy from effects of the crisis in the US financial sector through ini-
tiatives such as restrictions on cross-border mergers and acquisitions of financial
institutions, and liquidity and capital support to local banks by central banks.
Such actions help to break the existing linkages of relationship between finan-
cial sectors across the countries. For example, Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012) find that
policy interventions, in particular in financial sector reduced the interbank credit
and liquidity risks in advanced economies. Klyuev et al. (2009) state that policy
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initiatives contributed to reduce the risk of financial system. In such case, it is
most likely to take effect through common factor.
In summary, the results from conditional factor model in this Chapter are
qualitatively similar to the results from unconditional factor model in Chapter 2,
and provide the evidence of contagion during the GFC. In Chapter 4, we move to a
more elaborate description of the potential means by which crises are transmitted
and constitute contagion.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter re-examines the financial contagion in the equity markets of ad-
vanced and BRIC economies during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 by
using the conditional factor model of Dungey and Renault (2013) and the ad-
justed correlation approach of Forbes and Rigobon (2002). The results from the
conditional factor model suggest that there exist structural relationships between
the US aggregate equity market and aggregate equity market of other advanced
and emerging markets; these relationships experienced a structural shift during
the global financial crisis suggesting potential contagion effects via a common
factor. However, the results from the financial sectors considered alone suggest
that the structural relationships between the US financial sector and financial
sector of other sample countries which exist during the pre-crisis period have
broken completely during the crisis period. We attribute this to the impact of
domestic financial sector policy initiatives to reduce the systematic crisis effect
in the financial sector which originated in the US financial sector.
Chapter 4
Contagion and Banking Crises:
International Evidence for
2007-2009
4.1 Introduction
Banking crises are costly, and a great deal of prudential effort is undertaken to
avoid them. Bordo et al. (2001) estimate losses of around 6% of GDP associ-
ated with a banking crises in the last quarter of the 20th century, and in the
most recent period Laeven and Valencia (2013) document losses of about 30% of
GDP. Maintaining sound macroeconomic fundamentals, a clear legal framework
and strong prudential oversight are preventative measures within the remit of
domestic authorities. However, banking crises transmitted from other jurisdic-
tions present a considerable risk to the domestic economy (Kalemli-Ozcan et al.,
2013), particularly as banking crises are often observed to precede even more
costly currency and debt crises (Laeven and Valencia, 2013; Reinhart and Rogoff,
2009).
This chapter empirically examines the evidence for the unexpected interna-
tional transmission of banking crises via stressful conditions in financial markets.
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These transmissions are beyond those which would occur by the known spillovers
between banking sectors in different jurisdictions due to trading or portfolio links,
and instead consist of contagion effects (Bae et al., 2003; Bekaert et al., 2005;
Corsetti et al., 2005; Dungey et al., 2005; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Iwatsubo
and Inagaki, 2007; van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2003). We find significant evi-
dence not only for the existence of contagion, but also for its role in promoting
banking crises in regions geographically removed from the crisis source. Thus, we
contribute to the growing body of literature examining the role of banks in the
transmission of financial crisis of 2007-2009, most of whom find evidence of in-
ternational transmission via the banking sector (Allen et al., 2014; Brealey et al.,
2012; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013; Popov and Udell, 2012).
The model encapsulates several potential channels of contagion and testable
hypotheses in a single framework. Specifically, it captures potential structural
changes in global systematic risk exposure (systematic contagion), additional US
idiosyncratic shocks (idiosyncratic contagion), a structural shift (shift contagion)
and additional US volatility spillovers (volatility contagion). The last one cap-
tures the argument that financial markets exhibit explosive volatility during crises
that may spillover to other markets (Edwards, 1998; Engle et al., 1990; Hamao
et al., 1990). Using a standard factor model representation of an international
CAPM framework, the model allows for spillover effects outside crisis periods
(Kim, 2001; Laxton and Prasad, 2000), volatility spillovers, heteroskedasticity
and skewness in the financial data with a nested EGARCH specification. The
framework is most closely related to the models of Baur (2012), Bekaert et al.
(2005), and Dungey et al. (2005).1 As the crisis is widely accepted to have origi-
1Although our factor model framework is similar to that of Bekaert et al. (2014), it differs in a
number of directions. First, we define contagion as structural shifts (changes in both intercept
and slope) in factor model specification whereas they define contagion as structural shift in
intercept only (crisis dummy). Second, we focus on assessing contagion across the banking
sectors of 50 countries whereas they examine 415 country-sector equity portfolios across 55
countries but doesn’t provide contagion results and analysis at sector level for each country.
Third, our framework captures the volatility spillovers and volatility contagion whereas their
framework does not. Finally, we use maximum likelihood estimator where they use pooled
ordinary least square estimator.
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nated in the US we consider contagion effects from the US to 49 country banking
sector indices - covering both non-crisis and crisis conditions from 2001 to 2009.
There are two major results. First, we categorize the evidence for contagion
between the 50 banking sectors. The banking sectors in most economies expe-
rienced contagion from the US in some form – that is systematic, idiosyncratic,
shift or volatility – but not necessarily all forms. About 60 percent of our sample
banking market experienced a break in global systematic risk exposure and about
60 percent of banking markets in our sample experienced idiosyncratic contagion
originating from the US banking market. While most of the banking markets have
volatility spillovers from the US banking market in non-crisis periods, only about
40 percent of sample banking markets experienced volatility contagion during the
crisis period. Finally, shift contagion is always accompanied by other forms of
contagion.
The second contribution links evidence on contagion to the occurrence of bank-
ing crises. Linking our results for contagion with the systemic banking crisis data
in Leaven and Valencia (2012) reveals that crisis shocks transmitted from a for-
eign jurisdiction via idiosyncratic contagion increase the likelihood of a systemic
crisis in the domestic banking system by almost 27 percent, whereas increased
global systematic risk exposure via systematic contagion does not necessarily
destabilize the domestic banking system. The existing literature argues that the
probability of systemic banking crises is reduced by stronger regulatory capital
(Acharya et al., 2010; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Cole, 2012; Miles et al., 2013),
the size of the banking sector and higher market concentration (Allen and Gale,
2000; Beck et al., 2006; Bretschger et al., 2012; Mirzaei et al., 2013), and reduced
activity in the shadow banking sector (De Jonghe, 2010; Lepetit et al., 2008). We
find that stronger regulatory capital and retail banking activities lead to reduced
probability of banking crisis even in the presence of contagion effects, but that
while the impact of higher market concentration is positive it is insignificant. The
evidence suggests a larger economic impact of stronger regulatory capital, which
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reduces the probability of crisis by 11 percent, than for proportion of non-interest
income in total income, which only increases the probability of crisis by less than
1 percent. Likewise, domestic conditions can help ameliorate the probability of
crises, increased banking assets as a proportion of GDP lower the the probability
of crisis, but the economic impact is very small, at 0.1 percent. An increase in the
external debt to GDP ratio also increases the probability of crisis, by 1 percent,
consistent with the hypothesis that a feedback loop exists between sovereign debt
and banking crises, (Acharya et al., 2014; Adler, 2012).
Our results argue that systematic contagion effects are being adequately tack-
led with current policy responses – they are not significantly affecting the prob-
ability of a domestic banking crisis emerging as a result of a crisis elsewhere.
However, there is scope for further reduction in banking crises promoted by in-
ternational linkages via idiosyncratic contagion. Idiosyncratic contagion occurs
in response to unanticipated country-specific banking sector shocks. It represents
the transmission of these shocks other than via usual linkages such as portfolios
or trading links which are present during non-crisis periods. Potentially there is
gain for regulators and policy makers to consider how to creatively respond to
calm these transmissions and extra vulnerability generated in one economy, but
unexpectedly transmitting to another.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, we propose a model
to test for several forms of contagion and describes the sample and data. Section
4.3 provides the results for contagion. In Section 4.4 we examine the cross-section
of systemic banking crisis and Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Modeling Financial Contagion
4.2.1 The Empirical Framework
In modern banking systems, banking institutions are often globally integrated
through both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet linkages. These global link-
ages make the banking sector potentially more exposed to global systematic risk
than other sectors. The financial sector is known to be highly globally integrated
at sectoral level (Bekaert et al., 2009). We postulate that in a globally integrated
banking system the exposure of banks in a given country to global systematic
risk depends on the extent of global integration of the banking system.2
Let ri,t represents the return for banking sector of country i at time t. A
standard international market model representation of asset returns takes the
following form:
ri,t = a0,i + a1,if
global
t + ei,t, (4.1)
where f global refers to global factor or common shock and can be proxied by the
return on the aggregate global banking sector index and a1,i measures the global
systematic risk exposure of the banking sector of country i .
Crises may be associated with structural changes in the global systematic
risk exposure of banking markets through a number of possible channels. For
example, the interbank market may not function properly during the crisis period,
the existing network of relationships across the market participants may break
down, or the failure of a few financial institutions may have systemic impact on
other banks. The potential increased exposure of banks to global systematic risk
during a crisis period is denoted as systematic contagion, and is analogous to
a common shocks effect or fundamentals based contagion (Baur, 2012; Bekaert
et al., 2005, 2014) as revealed in Eq. (4.2) below:
2See Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) for a recent theoretical contribution.
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ri,t = a0,i + a1,if
global
t + a2,if
global
t It + εi,t, (4.2)
where It is an indicator function that takes value 0 during the normal period
and 1 during a crisis period. The coefficient a2,i captures the changes in global
systematic risk exposure during the crisis period.
Policy intervention in the financial system during crisis periods is often specif-
ically designed to reduce an individual country’s global systematic risk exposure.
If the policy measures were effective, then the global systematic risk exposure
of a given banking market may have been reduced during the crisis instead of
increased.3 This is akin to the debate around whether increased international
financial integration may or may not contribute to increased output correlation
(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013).
The existing literature suggests that US shocks have a significant influence
on other economies during calm periods, reflecting its market leadership in many
segments of the economy, its influence in portfolios and the position of the US
dollar as a global reserve currency. Following Masson (1999), we denote these as
spillover effects. However, during a period of stress, shocks from the crisis origi-
nating economy may impact over and above these spillovers, denoted as idiosyn-
cratic contagion, (Dungey et al., 2005; Dungey and Martin, 2007). In the current
chapter we denote the US banking sector as the crucible of the crisis and consider
the evidence for idiosyncratic contagion from the US to other markets. Finally,
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that a crisis may bring a structural shift in the
existing relationships above and beyond that accounted for by structural breaks in
factor relationships, potentially attributable to herd behavior amongst investors
which does not depend on economic fundamentals (Bekaert et al., 2014).4 Our
3However, the alternative to reduced global exposure is not necessarily proof of lack of policy
efficacy as we do not have a true proxy of what the outcome would have been in the absence of
policy actions.
4Bekaert et al. (2014) refer this as “herding contagion”.
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final levels specification captures each of these channels as follows:
rj,t = bj,0+b1,jf
global
t +b2,jf
global
t It+b3,jf
US
t +b4,jf
US
t It+b5,jIt+ξj,t; j = 1, ..., n−1 6= US
(4.3)
where the US factor, fUS, is extracted as the residual from applying Eq. (4.2)
to i = US, thus orthogonalizing the global and US factors. In Eq. (4.3), the
coefficient b1,j represents a standard CAPM beta coefficient against global mar-
kets, b2,j represents systemic contagion, b3,j measures the general spillover effects
of US shocks, b4,j measures the additional effects of US shocks during the crisis
period, that is idiosyncratic contagion and b5,j captures any intercept shift in the
factor model representation or shift contagion during the crisis period.
4.2.2 The GARCH Framework and Measuring Volatility
Contagion
Financial return series generally exhibit heteroskedasticity. To capture this we
incorporate the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedas-
ticity (EGARCH) model of Nelson (1991), which has the advantage that it does
not require non-negativity constraints on parameters. GARCH(1,1) is usually suf-
ficient to capture the financial data properties (Engle, 1982; Hansen and Lunde,
2005). The variance equation of the EGARCH model (to accompany mean equa-
tions given in Eq. (4.1-4.3)) can be expressed as:
ln(σ2i,t) = c0,i + c1,i(|zi,t−1| − E|zi,t−1|) + c2,izi,t−1 + c3,iln(σ2i,t−1);
zi,t−1 = ηi,t−1/σi,t−1; ηi,t = {ei,t, εi,t, ξj,t}
ηi,t ∼ Student− t(0, σ2i,t).
(4.4)
To capture the US volatility spillover effects in the variance equation of the
non-US markets, the variance equation those markets takes the following form:
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Table 4.1: List of banking markets considered
America Europe
1 Argentina 24 Austria
2 Brazil 25 Belgium
3 Canada 26 Bulgaria
4 Chile 27 Cyprus
5 Mexico 28 Czech Rep
6 Peru 29 Denmark
7 Venezuela 30 Finland
8 US 31 France
Asia 32 Germany
9 Australia 33 Greece
10 China 34 Hungary
11 Hong Kong 35 Ireland
12 India 36 Italy
13 Indonesia 37 Luxemburg
14 Israel 38 Malta
15 Japan 39 Netherlands
16 Korea 40 Norway
17 Malaysia 41 Poland
18 Pakistan 42 Portugal
19 Philippine 43 Romania
20 Singapore 44 Russia
21 Sri Lanka 45 Slovenia
22 Taiwan 46 Spain
23 Thailand 47 Sweden
48 Switzerland
49 Turkey
50 UK
ln(σ2j,t) = c0,j + c1,j(|zj,t−1| − E|zj,t−1|) + c2,jzj,t−1 + c3,jln(σ2j,t−1)
+pi1,jln(σˆ
2
us,t) + pi2,jln(σˆ
2
us,t)It; j = 1, ..., n− 1 6= US.
(4.5)
In Eq. (4.5) the parameter estimate pi1,j captures the general US volatility
spillover and pi2,j captures additional US volatility spillover for market j during
the crisis period which we denote as volatility contagion. The GARCH framework
provided in Eq. (4.5) is motivated by Hamao et al. (1990); Edwards (1998);
Iwatsubo and Inagaki (2007), amongst others.
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4.2.3 Sample, Data and Crisis period
The data set comprise daily equity indices of banking sectors for 50 countries
including the US for January 2, 2001 to May 8, 2009 available in Thompson
Datastream. Table 4.1 provides the list of banking markets considered in this
chapter.5 The aggregate world banking sector index returns provide the global
factor.6 In line with existing literature we use two-day rolling moving averages
to deal with differing time zones and asynchronous trading times as in Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) and adjust time/date as Day 01 in US/Americas = Day 2
in Asia and Europe. As in Chapter 2, we define the crisis period endogenously
using the Iterative Cumulative Sum of Square (ICSS) algorithm based on the
CUSUM test to detect the structural change in variance of an individual return
series (Inclan and Tiao, 1994; Sanso et al., 2004) and use the identified break in
the US banking sector index return to determine the crisis period. Using this
procedure the endogenously chosen crisis period is from July 19, 2007 to May 08,
2009. These dates are consistent with the existing literature, see Bekaert et al.
(2014) and the extensive overview of dates provided in Dungey et al. (2013).
4.3 Contagion Results and Discussion
The resulting evidence for contagion is reported in Table 4.2. Almost all of the 49
individual banking markets have statistically significant and positive systematic
comovement with the global banking market throughout the sample, evidenced
by b1 6= 0, indicating exposure to global systematic risk. The parameter estimates
support that the level of global integration is higher for advanced countries, con-
5Datastream provides banking sector equity index data for 59 countries; however, the data
for some countries are not available for the whole sample periods, therefore, restricting our
sample size to 50.
6The series used is Datastream mnemonic bankswd. The literature suggests that banking
and insurance sectors have high level of global integration at sectoral level (Bekaert et al., 2009)
and industry factors dominate country factors while explaining the equity returns (Cavaglia
et al., 2000). The results are robust to the alternative of using the aggregate world equity index
(totmkwd) as the global factor.
4 Contagion and Banking Crises 68
sistent with evidence in Laeven and Valencia (2013). These cross-border linkages
may reflect both on and off balance sheet channels (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011;
Sbracia and Zaghini, 2003).
The results provide evidence for the severity of disruptions in the 2007-2009
crisis. Exposure to the global systematic risk factor changed significantly for 29
of the 49 countries, that is b2 6= 0 as reported in Table 3, consistent with these
markets experiencing systematic contagion during the crisis, and prior evidence
on structural breaks in the relationship with global conditions during crisis pe-
riods (Dornbusch et al., 2000; Dungey et al., 2005). However, this evidence is
strongly skewed towards the developing markets. Many of the advanced markets
did not experience a structural break, that is, the hypothesis b2 = 0 is not re-
jected in France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Norway, Portugal and the UK. We cannot
distinguish here whether the policy actions undertaken were sufficient to offset
any potential change, or whether no change was experienced. In Japan, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland the results go further in
that the hypothesis b2 < 0 is not rejected. In these countries the potential for
an increased factor loading (b2) during the crisis observed in other jurisdictions
was not present, and this may reflect that their policy initiatives were effective
in suppressing the transmission of the crisis to the domestic banking system, in
line with the findings of Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012).
Four countries did not have a significant link with the global factor during
the pre-crisis period, that is b1 = 0. This potentially reflects that each of these
countries, Bulgaria, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela, is a relatively small and
closed market. However, during the crisis, this was no longer the case for Peru
and Bulgaria, (b2 6= 0) and they were exposed to global conditions, although Sri
Lanka and Venezuela continued to remain isolated in this respect.
In addition to responding to global conditions, the majority of markets also
experienced spillovers from the US during the non-crisis periods. Of the 49 mar-
kets 29 experienced idiosyncratic shock effects from the US banking market, ev-
4 Contagion and Banking Crises 69
Ta
bl
e
4.
2:
P
ar
am
et
er
es
ti
m
at
es
an
d
hy
po
th
es
is
te
st
in
g
re
su
lt
s
G
lo
ba
l
Sy
st
em
at
ic
Id
io
sy
nc
ra
ti
c
St
ru
ct
ur
al
V
ol
at
ili
ty
ex
po
su
re
co
nt
ag
io
n
co
nt
ag
io
n
sh
ift
co
nt
ag
io
n
C
hi
-s
qu
ar
e
te
st
:
Jo
in
t
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
SN
C
ou
nt
ry
(b
1
)
(b
2
)
(b
4
)
(b
5
)
(pi
2
)
b 2
=
b 4
=
0
b 2
=
pi
2
=
0
b 4
=
pi
2
=
0
b 2
=
b 4
=
pi
2
=
0
P
an
el
A
:N
o
co
nt
ag
io
n
1
Is
ra
el
0.
29
7*
**
0.
02
0
0.
07
7
0.
00
0
-0
.0
03
2.
26
0.
27
2.
02
2.
35
2
M
al
ay
si
a
0.
25
6*
**
0.
04
4
0.
03
1
0.
00
0
-0
.0
05
3.
31
2.
45
1.
47
3.
79
3
Si
ng
ap
or
e
0.
47
2*
**
-0
.0
36
0.
01
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
3
0.
64
1.
12
0.
62
1.
17
4
T
ai
w
an
0.
44
5*
**
-0
.0
13
0.
06
4
0.
00
0
0.
01
8
1.
23
2.
17
3.
45
3.
47
5
V
en
ez
ue
la
0.
03
6
-0
.0
08
0.
01
9
0.
00
0
-0
.0
14
0.
31
1.
81
1.
99
2.
02
6
H
on
g
K
on
g
0.
51
1*
**
0.
06
6*
*
0.
02
7
0.
00
1*
*
-0
.0
02
4.
79
*
4.
27
1.
13
5.
25
7
H
un
ga
ry
0.
57
8*
**
-0
.0
45
0.
15
0*
-0
.0
03
**
*
-0
.0
01
3.
79
0.
35
3.
50
3.
82
P
an
el
B
:V
ol
at
ili
ty
co
nt
ag
io
n
dr
iv
en
8
In
do
ne
si
a
0.
57
5*
**
0.
00
0
0.
10
0
0.
00
0
0.
03
9*
**
2.
03
11
.7
0*
**
13
.6
1*
**
13
.6
4*
**
9
K
or
ea
0.
88
0*
**
-0
.1
11
0.
07
8
-0
.0
03
**
*
0.
07
7*
**
3.
18
26
.8
8*
**
25
.6
0*
**
27
.7
8*
**
10
M
ex
ic
o
0.
52
7*
**
0.
00
9
-0
.0
82
**
0.
00
0
0.
06
2*
**
3.
99
18
.8
7*
**
22
.6
8*
**
22
.7
1*
**
11
R
us
si
a
0.
38
0*
**
0.
02
9
-0
.0
16
-0
.0
03
**
*
0.
02
6*
*
0.
22
6.
81
**
6.
66
**
6.
91
*
12
Sr
iL
an
ka
0.
01
0
0.
02
7
0.
00
4
-0
.0
01
**
*
0.
05
6*
**
1.
02
19
.0
2*
**
18
.0
9*
**
19
.1
3*
**
P
an
el
C
:S
ys
te
m
at
ic
co
nt
ag
io
n
dr
iv
en
13
C
an
ad
a
0.
63
3*
**
0.
21
2*
**
0.
04
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
6
49
.0
2*
**
46
.0
0*
**
2.
38
49
.3
3*
**
14
G
er
m
an
y
0.
70
3*
**
-0
.1
95
**
*
0.
08
6
-0
.0
01
0.
00
1
12
.6
7*
**
10
.7
3*
**
2.
62
12
.8
4*
**
15
P
er
u
0.
01
8
0.
18
8*
**
-0
.0
32
0.
00
0
-0
.0
13
67
.1
0*
**
67
.1
7*
**
2.
41
67
.7
2*
**
16
Sp
ai
n
0.
67
8*
**
-0
.2
25
**
*
0.
02
7
-0
.0
01
0.
00
5*
18
.5
5*
**
21
.4
1*
**
3.
07
21
.7
2*
**
P
an
el
D
:I
di
os
yn
cr
at
ic
co
nt
ag
io
n
dr
iv
en
17
C
hi
le
0.
51
9*
**
-0
.0
51
0.
10
1*
**
-0
.0
01
*
0.
00
6
9.
58
**
*
2.
65
8.
20
**
9.
89
**
18
Fr
an
ce
0.
67
3*
**
0.
04
0
0.
16
1*
**
-0
.0
02
**
0.
00
1
8.
02
**
0.
64
7.
83
**
8.
07
**
19
G
re
ec
e
0.
49
6*
**
0.
08
2
0.
20
0*
**
-0
.0
01
0.
00
7
16
.6
8*
**
2.
89
15
.0
9*
**
18
.1
2*
**
20
It
al
y
0.
53
9*
**
-0
.0
66
0.
13
9*
**
-0
.0
01
*
0.
00
1
10
.7
2*
**
1.
80
9.
61
**
*
10
.9
8*
*
21
M
al
ta
0.
06
4*
**
0.
00
5
0.
10
2*
**
0.
00
0
0.
01
1
13
.2
8*
**
1.
08
13
.9
4*
**
14
.4
7*
**
22
N
or
w
ay
0.
49
1*
**
0.
08
1
0.
40
7*
**
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
02
34
.8
7*
**
1.
29
34
.2
4*
**
35
.3
5*
**
23
P
ol
an
d
0.
41
0*
**
0.
08
9
0.
14
0*
*
-0
.0
02
**
0.
01
0
7.
23
**
2.
55
5.
39
*
7.
59
*
24
U
K
0.
57
3*
**
0.
06
3
0.
24
6*
**
-0
.0
02
**
*
0.
00
0
19
.8
5*
**
1.
13
18
.9
2*
**
19
.8
7*
**
(c
on
tin
ue
d
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
)
4 Contagion and Banking Crises 70
Ta
bl
e
4.
2
co
nt
in
ue
d:
P
ar
am
et
er
es
ti
m
at
es
an
d
hy
po
th
es
is
te
st
in
g
re
su
lt
s
SN
C
ou
nt
ry
b 1
b 2
b 4
b 5
pi
2
b 2
=
b 4
=
0
b 2
=
pi
2
=
0
b 4
=
pi
2
=
0
b 2
=
b 4
=
pi
2
=
0
25
C
ze
ch
R
ep
0.
37
5*
**
0.
12
4*
*
0.
17
4*
**
0.
00
0
-0
.0
03
12
.3
6*
**
4.
21
7.
03
**
12
.7
2*
**
26
Ja
pa
n
0.
71
6*
**
-0
.0
95
*
0.
21
6*
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
14
.9
0*
**
3.
17
13
.4
6*
**
15
.0
3*
**
27
P
or
tu
ga
l
0.
31
6*
**
-0
.0
16
0.
25
5*
**
-0
.0
03
**
*
-0
.0
16
*
36
.1
9*
**
3.
45
41
.1
0*
**
41
.1
7*
**
P
an
el
E
:M
ul
ti
pl
e
dr
iv
er
s
28
A
us
tr
ia
0.
32
4*
**
0.
32
8*
**
0.
26
1*
**
-0
.0
02
**
-0
.0
16
50
.9
9*
**
30
.4
4*
**
21
.1
4*
**
51
.9
7*
**
29
B
el
gi
um
0.
55
8*
**
0.
18
3*
**
0.
25
9*
**
-0
.0
02
**
*
0.
00
1
28
.1
0*
**
7.
94
**
19
.3
9*
**
28
.1
9*
**
30
C
yp
ru
s
0.
44
0*
**
0.
23
3*
**
0.
17
7*
**
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
24
.6
3*
**
14
.6
3*
**
9.
48
**
*
24
.9
5*
**
31
D
en
m
ar
k
0.
46
5*
**
0.
08
8*
0.
20
4*
**
-0
.0
02
**
*
0.
01
2
20
.1
4*
**
5.
24
*
18
.3
5*
**
22
.7
1*
**
32
Ir
el
an
d
0.
52
1*
**
0.
35
6*
**
0.
36
7*
**
-0
.0
03
**
*
-0
.0
02
32
.0
2*
**
15
.7
5*
**
21
.1
9*
**
32
.5
4*
**
33
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
0.
66
8*
**
-0
.2
53
**
*
-0
.1
65
**
*
-0
.0
02
**
-0
.0
01
26
.9
4*
**
16
.4
3*
**
8.
11
**
26
.9
6*
**
34
P
ak
is
ta
n
0.
19
6*
**
-0
.1
70
**
*
0.
13
6*
**
-0
.0
02
**
*
0.
00
9
25
.6
9*
**
20
.6
0*
**
10
.0
7*
**
27
.8
1*
**
35
P
hi
lip
pi
ne
s
0.
31
5*
**
0.
12
4*
**
0.
12
6*
**
0.
00
0
-0
.0
16
22
.7
3*
**
11
.2
9*
**
10
.2
3*
**
24
.1
5*
**
36
R
om
an
ia
0.
16
5*
**
0.
35
9*
**
0.
22
7*
**
-0
.0
02
**
*
-0
.0
19
64
.2
6*
**
48
.0
7*
**
18
.3
7*
**
69
.0
0*
**
37
Sl
ov
en
ia
0.
05
0*
*
0.
10
8*
**
0.
14
7*
**
0.
00
0
0.
02
7
39
.5
3*
**
15
.2
1*
**
25
.1
8*
**
41
.6
4*
**
38
Sw
it
ze
rl
an
d
0.
80
3*
**
-0
.1
22
**
0.
12
8*
*
-0
.0
02
**
*
0.
00
3
9.
35
**
*
5.
45
*
6.
42
**
10
.5
7*
*
39
A
rg
en
ti
na
0.
54
4*
**
-0
.1
93
**
*
0.
03
8
-0
.0
02
**
*
0.
02
1*
*
19
.7
8*
**
25
.8
0*
**
6.
40
**
25
.8
9*
**
40
B
ra
zi
l
1.
17
9*
**
-0
.1
93
**
*
-0
.0
09
-0
.0
01
0.
03
5*
**
11
.9
6*
**
22
.5
5*
**
12
.3
7*
**
22
.6
9*
**
41
C
hi
na
0.
12
9*
**
0.
12
1*
**
-0
.0
18
0.
00
0
-0
.0
84
**
*
7.
10
**
33
.3
7*
**
25
.6
0*
**
33
.3
8*
**
42
T
ha
ila
nd
0.
49
0*
**
-0
.1
33
**
0.
03
7
0.
00
0
0.
04
7*
**
6.
59
**
14
.7
7*
**
9.
20
**
14
.9
9*
**
43
A
us
tr
al
ia
0.
51
5*
**
0.
21
7*
**
0.
12
7*
**
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
22
**
27
.1
6*
**
23
.4
6*
**
13
.0
8*
**
33
.7
0*
**
44
F
in
la
nd
0.
34
0*
**
0.
11
4*
*
0.
30
2*
**
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
35
**
38
.7
1*
**
0.
64
7.
83
**
8.
07
**
45
In
di
a
0.
44
3*
**
0.
15
4*
*
0.
25
5*
**
0.
00
0
-0
.0
36
**
*
22
.1
3*
**
13
.7
8*
**
24
.3
5*
**
32
.2
0*
**
46
B
ul
ga
ri
a
0.
04
9
0.
38
8*
**
0.
09
4*
-0
.0
03
**
*
-0
.0
62
**
*
49
.5
5*
**
55
.2
3*
**
12
.9
4*
**
60
.8
9*
**
47
Lu
xe
m
bu
rg
0.
16
2*
**
0.
11
8*
**
0.
15
0*
**
-0
.0
01
**
*
-0
.0
44
**
*
34
.9
1*
**
25
.5
7*
**
29
.5
6*
**
46
.5
0*
**
48
Sw
ed
en
0.
69
1*
**
-0
.1
66
**
0.
26
3*
**
-0
.0
02
**
0.
01
1*
*
22
.0
4*
**
11
.8
6*
**
21
.7
5*
**
27
.8
0*
**
49
T
ur
ke
y
0.
77
0*
**
-0
.2
45
**
0.
20
5*
-0
.0
01
0.
04
7*
**
8.
68
**
23
.5
7*
**
20
.6
0*
**
25
.6
4*
**
50
U
S
0.
90
8*
**
0.
26
8*
**
-0
.0
02
**
N
ot
e:
T
he
va
lu
es
in
co
lu
m
n
fo
r
b 1
,
b 2
,b
4
,b
5
an
d
pi
2
ar
e
th
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
es
ti
m
at
es
fr
om
E
qs
.
(4
.3
)
an
d
(4
.5
).
T
he
va
lu
es
fo
r
jo
in
t
te
st
ar
e
th
e
C
hi
-s
qu
ar
e
va
lu
es
.
**
*,
**
,a
nd
*
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
ls
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
at
1%
,5
%
an
d
10
%
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
4 Contagion and Banking Crises 71
idenced by b3 6= 0. The notable exceptions are a mixture of advanced banking
markets (Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Korea,
Norway, Portugal and Taiwan) and emerging banking markets (China, Indonesia,
Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela). When
the estimate b3 is negative it indicates the potential for portfolio diversification
benefits relative to the US, which is the case for a mixture of advanced markets
such as Japan, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia and emerging markets such as
Brazil, Chile, India, Pakistan and Philippines. However, this effect appears to be
dampened during the crisis, as the US idiosyncratic effects have an overwhelm-
ingly positive transmission to these markets. The hypothesis b3 + b4 = 0 is not
rejected in most of these markets. The Brazilian and Peruvian markets appear
to have consistently negative response to US originated shocks even during the
crisis period, consistent with recent evidence that the Latin American banking
market was little effected by the GFC (Kamil and Rai, 2010; Ocampo, 2009).
Almost all of the banking sectors show evidence of volatility spillover ef-
fects during the non-crisis period, supporting the contention that the inclusion
of volatility transmission is important in the model specification.7 During the
non-crisis period the countries which do not experience volatility spillovers are
two Asian markets - China and Pakistan and two Latin American markets -
Argentina and Peru. Clearly, the overall evidence presented here supports the
banking sector in Peru as relatively isolated from international capital markets.
The crisis also caused a structural shift as specified in Eq. 4.3, that is b5 = 0
is rejected for 23 of the 49 countries. Each of these countries also have evidence
of a break in the structural parameters (b2, b4 or pi2). The evidence for structural
shifts during the crisis period is consistent with the occurrence of herding behavior
in addition to global shocks and the US idiosyncratic shocks during the GFC.
7The statistically significant parameter estimates for c1 and c2 for most of the markets
support the EGARCH specification in Eq. (4.5).
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4.3.1 Evidence of Contagion
Table 4.2 shows that almost all of the 49 banking markets in the sample ex-
perienced some form of contagion from the US. The null of no contagion in
any form - systematic, idiosyncratic or volatility - given by the joint test for
b2 = b4 = pi2 = 0, is rejected in most cases.8 The exceptions are Hong Kong,
Hungary, Israel, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Venezuela. These markets
are generally small economies although with a great variety of exposure to in-
ternational markets. Israel, for example, is an isolated small developed market.
The exception is Malaysia, a relatively large economy, which had built significant
buffers in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997-98, and a banking system
with negligible exposure to the US sub-prime loan products (Khoon and Mah-
Hui, 2010). Also in Asia, the financial hub of Singapore, had liquid and well
capitalized domestic banks and foreign banks with liquidity assurance from their
head office (a formal commitment required for licensing procedure) which reduced
the exposure of the Singaporean banking sector to contagion. Hong Kong and
Hungary represent somewhat different cases, in that the null hypothesis for the
joint test (b2 = b4 = pi2 = 0) is not rejected but the null hypothesis for individual
univariate tests of contagion effects are rejected. In the case of Hong Kong, the
null of no systemic contagion b2 = 0 , is rejected. In the case of Hungary, the null
of no idiosyncratic contagion, b4 = 0, is rejected. Despite the overall evidence for
no contagion, the Hong Kong banking sector displays sensitivity to global shocks
(fundamentals), and the Hungarian banking sector to US idiosyncratic shocks.
Our results for the banking sectors in these countries are consistent with the
IMF Country Reports 2008 and 2009 for these countries which suggest that their
banking sectors performed well during the crisis, an outcome often attributed in
the discourse to effective policy initiatives.
8We also consider potential joint tests incorporating b5, such as b2 = b4 = b5 = pi2 = 0;
b2 = b4 = b5 = 0. The results are similar as b5 is always accompanied some other contagion
estimates (b2,b4, or pi2).
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Figure 4.1: Univariate hypothesis test
Figure 4.1 provides a schematic representation of the clustering of the dif-
ferent individual coefficient hypothesis testing results, for systematic contagion,
idiosyncratic contagion and volatility contagion, providing a convenient means of
discussion. The distinction between bold and plain text relates to the links to
identified systemic banking crises to be discussed below.
4.3.1.1 Volatility Contagion
A small group of countries (Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia and Sri Lanka)
have contagion effects driven largely by volatility contagion. These countries
do not have level effects, that is, no evidence of either systematic contagion or
idiosyncratic contagion.9 With the exception of Sri Lanka, the countries in this
group are markets which were involved in financial crises during the 1990s and
might have learned from that experience. However, the high level of market
uncertainty caused by the GFC resulted in increased market volatility in these
9When we look at univariate hypothesis testing, however, the null for no idiosyncratic con-
tagion (b4 = 0) is rejected for Mexico
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countries. The literature suggests that the banking systems in Indonesia and
Korea particularly were relatively healthy and had less exposure to US sub-prime
products (IMF, 2009b,c). In the case of Mexico, although the aggregate economy
was hit hard, the banking sector was relatively resilient during the crisis (IMF,
2009d).
4.3.1.2 Systematic Contagion
A further small group of countries (Canada, Germany, Peru and Spain) have
evidence of contagion effects driven largely by systematic contagion. These are
large advanced economies (except Peru which is a small closed economy) with
strong international banking linkages. It may be that these linkages are sufficient
to enable systematic contagion to affect the domestic markets. None of these
markets experienced idiosyncratic contagion. Despite the fact that the German
banking sector experienced huge losses - about 57 percent of stock market cap-
italization for banking sector stocks - and German banks were highly involved
in asset backed securities, we do not find a statistically significant result for id-
iosyncratic contagion from the US to Germany. The German banking system
forms the basis of its capital markets, and during the crisis German banks faced
problems with leverage, liquidity and funding (Acharya and Schnabl, 2010).
In Spain the direct impact of the crisis on the banking sector was limited as
the banks had a retail-oriented business model and negligible exposure to US sub-
prime mortgages (Acharya and Schnabl, 2010; IMF, 2009e). However, when the
crisis spread to the global financial conditions and the real sector, the crisis was
transmitted to the Spanish banking sector through common conditions such as
tighter liquidity. The Spanish banking sector additionally experienced volatility
contagion in response to the higher turmoil in the US markets.
In the case of the Canadian banking system, despite its close proximity to US
(with strong real and financial linkages), it avoided crisis effects. Canadian banks
follow relatively conservative banking practices with strong prudential regulation,
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and consequently had lower exposure to sub-prime effects than the US (IMF,
2009f).
4.3.1.3 Idiosyncratic Contagion
In about one-fifth of the countries US idiosyncratic shocks played a dominant role
during the crisis. Countries in this group have a high level of global integration,
are advanced and relatively large European countries (Czech Republic, France,
Greece, Italy, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and UK) and Japan and Chile.
Countries in this group did not generally experience systematic contagion (except
Czech Republic and Japan) or volatility contagion (except Portugal). Since the
banking fundamentals of these countries were generally strong (Chile, Japan,
France, and Italy), and banks follow a traditional retail business model, these
banking systems were relatively resilient to the crisis. Consequently, the large
drop in the banking sector returns during the crisis was directly attributable to
the idiosyncratic shocks originating in the US banking sector.
4.3.1.4 Multiple Drivers
The final group consists of all those countries where the null of joint hypotheses
(bivariate and multivariate test) is rejected in all cases. All the countries in this
group experience systematic contagion and the majority of the countries are part
of the European Union. Seven countries (Australia, Finland, India, Luxemburg,
Romania, Sweden and Turkey) have all effects, that is the null hypothesis is re-
jected in univariate, bivariate and multivariate hypothesis tests. Five countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, and Thailand) have no idiosyncratic conta-
gion from the US (univariate test) and 10 countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Denmark, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Slovenia, and Switzer-
land) have no volatility contagion.
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4.4 Contagion and the Systemic Banking Crises
4.4.1 Contagion and the Cost of Crisis
We couple the evidence for contagion in the banking system with the data for
systemic banking crises provided in Laeven and Valencia (2013) to address the
relationships between channels of contagion and the presence and cost of banking
crises. Of the 41 banking markets in our sample which experienced contagion
in any form, 18 banking markets experienced a banking system crisis during the
GFC as documented in Laeven and Valencia (2013). The average output loss for
these countries is about 30 percent of GDP and the average fiscal cost is about 7
percent of GDP.10
Figure 4.1 highlights the countries classified by channels of contagion which
experienced systemic banking crises in emphasized bold. The majority of the
countries which experienced a banking crisis are clustered in two groups: ei-
ther experiencing both idiosyncratic and systematic contagion (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland) or idiosyncratic contagion
only (France, Greece, Hungary, Italy and the UK). Seven of 12 countries in the
systematic and idiosyncratic contagion group experienced a banking crisis. Table
3 shows shows that the average output loss (as a proportion of GDP) for these
countries was almost 34 percent, and when we exclude Switzerland, which expe-
rienced no output loss, this rises to around 39 percent. The standard deviation of
the output loss in this group is high, at 34 percent. The five countries which ex-
perience a banking crisis with only idiosyncratic contagion have a similar output
loss of 33 percent, but a much lower standard deviation of this loss at almost 9
10Laeven and Valencia (2013) consider a banking crisis as a systemic if (i) there is a financial
distress (as indicated by bank runs, losses in banking system, and/or bank liquidations), and
(ii) there is a policy intervention in response to significant losses in banking system. Output
losses are computed as the cumulative sum of the differences between actual and trend real
GDP over the crisis period. The fiscal costs are measured as the component of gross fiscal cost
related to the restructuring of the financial sector including fiscal costs associated with bank
recapitalization but excluding asset purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the Treasury.
See Laeven and Valencia (2013) for details.
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Table 4.3: Cost of systemic banking system crisis
Output Fiscal Output Fiscal
loss cost loss cost
Systematic and idiosyncratic Idiosyncratic only
Austria 14 4.9 France 23 1
Belgium 19 6 Greece 43 27.3
Denmark 36 3.1 Hungary 40 2.7
Ireland 106 40.7 Italy 32 0.3
Netherlands 23 12.7 UK 25 8.8
Slovenia 38 3.6 Average 32.6 8.0
Switzerland 0 1.1 St. dev. 8.8 11.3
Average 33.7 10.3
St. dev. 34.4 13.9 Systematic and volatility
Average (excl. Swiss) 39.3 11.8 Spain 39 3.8
St. dev. 34.0 14.6
All forms of contagion
Systematic only Luxembourg 36 7.7
Germany 11 1.8 Sweden 25 0.7
Average 30.5 4.2
Idiosyncratic and volatility st dev 7.8 4.9
Portugal 37 0
Overall
Volatility only Average 30.4 7.1
Russia 0 2.3 St. dev. 23.0 10.6
Note: Output loss and fiscal cost are expressed in percent of GDP. Data source: (Laeven and Valencia, 2013)
percent. The other forms of contagion associate less strongly with banking crises
than these two categories, with volatility contagion relatively unimportant.
The evidence from Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3 indicates that banking crises in
this sample are frequently associated with idiosyncratic contagion - which tends
to result in output loss. However, when this is coupled with the presence of
systematic contagion, then there is great uncertainty about the output loss, in
our sample the output loss for this group ranges from nothing in Switzerland to
106 percent of GDP in Ireland. In contrast, when only idiosyncratic contagion is
associated with a banking crisis, the range for output loss is smaller, between 20
and 40 percent of GDP.
The fiscal costs associated with the countries in banking crisis do not show this
distinction between the dominant types of contagion; the average fiscal costs are 8
percent or 10 percent of GDP for countries with both systemic and idiosyncratic
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contagion or idiosyncratic contagion only. These results point to the importance
of understanding the source of contagion and its links to banking crises. For
policy makers, it appears that the maximum uncertainty about the outcome of
a banking crisis occurs when both idiosyncratic and systematic contagion affect
the market.
4.4.2 Contagion, Industry Characteristics and the Systemic
Crises
In this section we formalize the discussion from the previous section and examine
the empirical evidence for the transmission of banking crises via different conta-
gion channels incorporating industry characteristics as control variables using a
Probit model as follows:
Pr(BankCrisisi = 1) = Φ(γo +X
′
iλ+W
′
i θ + Z
′
iδ) (4.6)
where Xi is a vector of indicator variables representing the contagion measures
identified in the Section 4.3, taking the value of 1 when that contagion channel is
statistically significant in the Table 4.2 (we exclude the volatility channel as it is
completely coincident with all occurrences and non-occurrences of crisis). Wi is a
vector of banking industry characteristics, Zi is a vector of macroeconomic control
variables, λ, θ and δ are the vectors of weights on each of these effects, and Φ is
the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. The
data for banking industry characteristics and control variables are from Cihak
et al. (2012) and available from World Bank website.11 Motivated by Beck et al.
(2006), Berger and Bouwman (2013) and Lepetit et al. (2008), we consider the
market concentration ratio (given by the market share of the 3 largest banks),
the bank capital ratio (ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets) and
bank income structure (non-interest income to total income ratio) to characterize
11http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development
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the banking industry.12 We use the relative size of the banking sector (ratio of
banking sector assets to GDP) and external debt exposure (ratio of total external
debt outstanding to GDP) as macroeconomic control variables. The control vari-
ables are kept at their pre-crisis period average.13 A detailed data description is
provided in Cihak et al. (2012) or on the Global Financial Development Database
of the World Bank website.
Three specifications of the model are presented in Table 4.4. Specification
(1) presents the coefficient estimates and marginal effects where only contagion
channels are present, specification (2) when only market control variables are
applied and specification (3) the full specification with the full set of X,W,Z
variables.
The probit model results reported in Table 4.4 support the hypothesis that
idiosyncratic contagion is an important avenue for systemic banking crises. The
presence of idiosyncratic contagion (a shock transmitted from the crisis origi-
nating country) increases the probability of systemic banking crisis in a country
by almost 27 percent. The contribution of systematic contagion, however, is
not statistically significant at conventional levels, suggesting that increased inter-
dependence amongst banking sectors through global factor does not necessarily
destabilize the domestic banking system. This does not necessarily mean that the
potential for systematic contagion should be paid less attention by policy makers.
The evidence suggests that policy issues taken during the global financial crisis
contributed to reduced tail risk in the financial system (Ait-Sahalia et al., 2012;
Gagnon et al., 2011; Klyuev et al., 2009). However, our results do suggest that
there remains significant evidence that crises transmitted via idiosyncratic shocks
may destabilize the domestic financial system, and policies designed to reduce the
potential for idiosyncratic contagion may result in reduced impact on domestic
12For robustness, we consider the alternatives of the 5 largest banks based concentration ratio
and the ratio of bank equity capital to total asset to proxy for bank capital. The results are
very similar.
13The results are robust to keeping control variables at 2006 level.
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economies.
We specifically test the hypotheses in the existing literature that larger, more
concentrated banking sectors with lower engagement in shadow banking activi-
ties and higher regulatory capital will have lower probability of crisis occurrence
(Acharya et al., 2010; Allen and Gale, 2000; Beck et al., 2006; Berger and Bouw-
man, 2013; Bretschger et al., 2012; Cole, 2012; De Jonghe, 2010; Lepetit et al.,
2008; Miles et al., 2013; Mirzaei et al., 2013). The results indicate support for
the hypothesis that higher regulatory bank capital reduces the likelihood of a
systemic banking crisis by about 11 percent. However, higher market concentra-
tion results in only an economically small reduction in the probability of a crisis,
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, providing only limited support for
the hypothesis that market concentration decreases the systemic risk, and the
size of the banking sector (given by the banking sector to GDP ratio) has no
significant effect. While the results for the non-interest income to total income
ratio variable are not uniformly significant, the marginal effects in specification
(3) indicate that where the banking sector engages less in retail banking activi-
ties and more in shadow banking activities the probability of a systemic crisis is
increased. Finally, the statistically significant (at 10 percent) marginal impact of
the external debt to GDP ratio on the probability of banking crisis supports the
hypothesised feedback loop between sovereign debt and banking crises (Acharya
et al., 2014; Adler, 2012).
In summary, the results show that the existence of idiosyncratic contagion
during a crisis provides a statistically significant contribution to increasing the
probability of a banking crisis in the recipient country, of 27 percent. This is a
substantial channel, and worthy of policymakers attention in their attempts to
mitigate the effects of foreign sourced crises on domestic economies. The usual
finding that good macroeconomic policy settings, such as influence the debt to
GDP ratio, are confirmed. As the literature suggests, higher regulatory capital
can play a significant offsetting role in reducing banking crises, but proposals
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around the size of the sector and relative engagement in shadow banking are
economically significant determinants in this analysis.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter implements a CAPM based modeling framework that encapsulates
several alternative channels of contagion and relates them to the observed evi-
dence for banking crises for 50 countries during the 2007-2009 global financial
crisis. We determine that banking crises are strongly positively related to ev-
idence of idiosyncratic contagion channels from the crisis originating countries.
Idiosyncratic contagion represents the unanticipated impact of shocks affecting
the crisis originating asset, in this case the US banking sector, and transmitted
to other banking sectors. It is differentiated from the transmission of common
shocks which hit the global markets. The common shocks may originate in the
US, but can be identified by their very commonality, which we denote as sys-
tematic contagion. It also differs from general shifts in the market conditions,
known as shift contagion, and transmission via changes in market volatility, or
volatility contagion. The framework implemented here distinguishes each of these
four channels of contagion and finds that although there appears to be clustered
evidence for effects of both systematic and idiosyncratic contagion on the proba-
bility of banking crises, statistically, only the links with idiosyncratic contagion
are significant. It is entirely possible that this result partly arises from the efforts
of policy makers around the globe to contain the systematic effects of the crisis,
thus dampening the systematic channel.
Our results provide evidences for the severity of 2007-2009 crisis. Banking
sectors across the world were disturbed by the crisis and were not immune to
contagion effects. About 60 percent of the sample banking markets experienced
a break in global systematic risk exposure, and about 60 percent of banking
markets experienced idiosyncratic contagion originating from the US banking
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market. While most banking markets show evidence of volatility spillovers from
the US banking markets during periods of market calm, only about 40 percent
of sample banking markets experienced volatility contagion during the crisis. We
established that evidence of a banking crisis seemed to be related to two clusters of
economies - one which experienced both systematic and idiosyncratic crises, and
one which experienced idiosyncratic contagion only. While the average output
loss effect of banking crises on these two groups of countries was quite similar, at
about one-third, the standard deviation of this loss was very different. The group
of countries which experienced only idiosyncratic contagion were more likely to
experience an average loss - that is the range of output loss experienced was much
smaller than the countries where systematic contagion was also significant.
The idiosyncratic shocks channel is empirically an important link in trans-
mitting shocks across international banking sectors, strongly related to the sub-
sequent occurrence of a banking crisis in the recipient country. Concentrated
banking sectors, strong regulatory capital requirements and a concentration in
retail banking income help to reduce the likelihood of systemic crisis, consistent
with the existing evidence. However, there is evidently more that can be done
by policy in identifying and defusing the transmission of country specific idiosyn-
cratic shocks that are potential sources of idiosyncratic contagion so as to reduce
the costs of any consequent banking crises.
Chapter 5
Jump Risk in the US Financial
Sector
5.1 Introduction
Recent advances in high frequency financial econometric techniques have opened
new frontiers for measuring financial risk (Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard, 2006;
Huang and Tauchen, 2005; Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010). It is now empirically
feasible to take advantage of financial data available every minute or even every
second. This chapter uses these advances to measure the systematic risk of finan-
cial firms. From the risk management perspective, if we assume that idiosyncratic
risks across firms are independent, what matters is the systematic risk. A small
shock to the market may have a profound effect on an individual firm with a high
systematic risk parameter. Acharya et al. (2010) argue that financial firms are
less able to cope with a significant drop in equity prices than non-financial firms.
This is one of the main reasons policy makers impose a high equity base on finan-
cial firms (Acharya et al., 2010). The recent financial crisis in the US has raised
concerns about the risk absorption capacity of financial firms and consequently
their contribution to the stability of financial system. This motivates the focus
on financial firms in this chapter.
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The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) provides the basic foundation for
measuring systematic risk (Sharpe, 1964). Conventionally the systematic risk
exposure of an asset is measured by beta - the magnitude of comovement of an
individual stock return with respect to market returns. This measure has been
widely used in practice (Graham and Harvey, 2001). However, this conventional
beta does not separately account for the continuous and jump price process of the
underlying assets. Merton (1976) suggests that the exclusion of jump processes
in a stochastic price process for an asset may produce a systematic bias in the
valuation of securities. Jarrow and Rosenfeld (1984) suggest that market portfolio
contains a jump component. Recent literature confirms the importance of jumps
in the stochastic price process (Huang and Tauchen, 2005; Jacod and Todorov,
2009). The systematic risk of a firm may vary when there is a discontinuity in the
price process of the benchmark market portfolio; such discontinuities are often
attributed to the unexpected arrival of news (shock) in the market. Therefore,
decomposing systematic risk into systematic continuous risk and systematic jump
risk is important as these two components may require different risk premia.1
We first detect the days on which jumps (price discontinuities) occur in a
benchmark market portfolio and estimate the magnitude of these jumps for the
US financial sector using the model-free approach postulated by Barndorff-Nielsen
and Shephard (2006), Andersen et al. (2007) and Huang and Tauchen (2005). We
create an equally weighted index for the financial sector as a benchmark portfo-
lio. We then adopt the approach of Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) to estimate
systematic risk (beta) for both continuous and jump components using 5-minute
transactions for a panel of 73 financial institutions (FIs) which are constituents
of the S&P 500 over the the period of 2003-2011. These financial firms include
banks (depositories), broker-dealers, insurers, real estate investment trusts (RE-
1Eraker et al. (2003) argue that jump component requires relatively larger risk premia than
continuous component because jumps generate the large crash-like movements. Pan (2002) also
finds evidence for large jump risk premia and Yan (2011) confirms that jump risk is priced in
expected stock return.
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ITs) and other financial institutions. We focus on estimating the time-varying
systematic risk exposures of each firm in these categories.
The literature suggests that similar responses to jumps across financial firms
may lead to a potential inherent systemic risk in the aggregate financial system
(Acharya et al., 2012; Das and Uppal, 2004; de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000; Nicolo
and Kwast, 2002). In this chapter, we formalize how systematic jump responses
are related to the systemic risk of financial firms. As our sample consists of
large US financial firms including the systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) identified by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), this provides grounds
to explore relationship between these two risk measures. Theoretically, system-
atic and systemic risk measures are interrelated. Systematic jump risk measures
the magnitude of response of an individual financial firm to an unexpected but
significant news shock in the financial sector index, whereas systemic risk mea-
sures a financial firm’s overall contribution to systemwide failure. In other words,
systematic jump risk is the market risk of an individual firm, whereas systemic
risk is an individual firm’s risk to the overall market (system).
Acharya et al. (2010) provide a framework to measure the contribution of
each financial firm to systemic risk focusing on expected capital shortfall of the
financial firms. Under this framework the systemic expected capital shortfall
is measured as the amount by which a financial institution is undercapitalized
when the overall financial system is undercapitalized. Financial institutions with
higher expected capital shortfalls contribute most to the overall financial sector
undercapitalization, and hence they are more systemically risky. Dungey et al.
(2012) provide a measure of systemic risk determined by the interconnectedness
amongst firms; a firm is systemically risky if it is strongly connected to many
other firms; and if its strongest linkages are with other systemically risky firms.
We extend this chapter by examining the relationship between systematic jump
risk and systemic risk measures of Acharya et al. (2010) and Dungey et al. (2012).
Our results show that the inclusion of jumps in price processes is important - of
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the 108 months in our sample we observe at least one jump in each of 70 months.
The average magnitude of jump beta is higher than that of the continuous beta
and this measure is relatively smaller for the crisis-period compared with the
pre-crisis period. At sub-sectoral level banks tend to have lower systematic risk
exposure than broker-dealers but higher than insurers. However this pattern is
time-varying. Our results further reveal that financial institutions with higher
capital shortfall systemic risk tend to have higher response to jumps whereas
more interconnected financial institutions tend to have lower response to jumps,
and more highly leveraged and small firms are more responsive to jumps in the
market than their counterparts.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 elaborates the jump
detection methodology and the Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) non-parametric
approach to estimating continuous and jump beta, Section 5.3 explains the sample
and data, Section 5.4 presents the results and Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.2 The Methodological Framework
5.2.1 Identifying Jumps
This section briefly describes the jump detection methodology advanced by Barndorff-
Nielsen and Shephard (2004, 2006). The log-price (pt) process of an asset at time
t can be represented by a stochastic differential equation as follows
dpt = αtdt+ σtdWt + κtdJt, (5.1)
where αt is the time-varying drift of price process, σt is the time-varying volatility
component, Wt is standard Brownian motion, Jt is a jump process and κt is the
size of the jump at time t. The counting process dJt = 1 if there is a jump at
time t, otherwise 0.
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Intra-day returns are defined as follows:
rt,s = pt,s − pt,(s−1) (5.2)
where rt,s refers to sth intra-day return on day t. The sampling frequency is such
that ∆s < t, resulting into n number of intra-day returns. For example, ∆s may
refer to 5 minutes.
Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) provide two measures of the quadratic
variation process - realized variance (RV ) and bi-power variation (BV ), which
converge uniformly to different measures of the underlying jump-diffusion process
as the sampling frequency increases,
RVt ≡
n∑
s=1
r2t,s
p−→
∫ t
t−1
σ2sds+
∫ t
t−1
κ2sdJs (5.3)
BVt ≡ pi
2
n
n− 1
n∑
s=1
|rt,s||rt,(s−1)| p−→
∫ t
t−1
σ2sds. (5.4)
In the absence of jumps, the difference between RV and BV is zero (Tauchen
and Zhou, 2011). If there are jumps, then
RVt −BVt →
∫ t
t−1
κ2sdJs. (5.5)
Since the squared jumps calculated from Eq.(5.5) may be negative, Andersen
et al. (2007) suggest truncating the actual empirical measurement at zero,
Jt ≡ max[RVt −BVt, 0]. (5.6)
Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) and Tauchen and Zhou (2011) suggest a
ratio statistic,
RJt =
RVt −BVt
RVt
, (5.7)
which, in the absence of jumps, converges to a standard normal distribution when
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scaled by its asymptotic variance. That is, if no jumps occur on day t, then
ZJt =
RJt√
1
n
{(
pi
2
)2
+ pi − 5
}
max
(
1, DVt
BV 2t
) d−→ N(0, 1), (5.8)
where DVt is the quad-power variation robust to jumps as shown in Barndorff-
Nielsen and Shephard (2004) and Andersen et al. (2007). The quad-power varia-
tion is approximated by
DVt ≡ n
(pi
2
)2 n∑
s=4
|rt,s||rt,(s−1)||rt,(s−2)||rt,(s−3)|. (5.9)
The rejection of null of no jumps in Eq. (5.8) provides evidence of jumps in a
stochastic price process for a given day based on given intra-day high-frequency
returns. Huang and Tauchen (2005) show that this test has excellent size and
power properties and is quite accurate in detecting jumps.
5.2.2 Estimating Systematic Risks: Continuous and Jump
Betas
The systematic risk, β, of an individual stock can be estimated using a conven-
tional CAPM framework as βi = cov(ri, rm)/var(rm), and can be represented in
market model form as follows:
ri,t,s = αi + βirm,t,s + ei,t,s (5.10)
where ri,t,s is the intra-day returns on an individual asset and rm,t,s is the intra-
day returns on the aggregate market at time t. The slope coefficient βi in Eq.
(5.10) measures the magnitude of the comovement of stock returns with respect
to market return and is the measure of systematic risk of an asset. The intensity
of this systematic risk exposure may vary when the price follows a continuous and
jump process (Merton, 1976; Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010), and therefore can be
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decomposed as continuous systematic risk exposure and jump risk exposure as
follows:
ri,t,s = αi + β
C
i r
C
m,t,s + β
J
i r
J
m,t,s + ei,t,s (5.11)
where βCi , and βJi measure the systematic risk associated with continuous and
jump movements in the market returns (rCm and rJm) respectively. If the systematic
risks of a firm to both movements are identical, that is, βCi = βJi then Eq. (5.11)
is equivalent to Eq. (5.10). However, the literature suggests that this is not
the case (Eraker, 2004; Pan, 2002; Yan, 2011). Recently, Todorov and Bollerslev
(2010) have provided a non-parametric approach to estimate βCi , and βJi .
Suppose that the stochastic log-price processes for market portfolio (dpm,t)
and individual stock (dpi,t) take the following forms:
dpm,t = αm,tdt+ σm,tdWm,t + κm,tdJm,t (5.12)
dpi,t = αi,tdt+ β
C
i σm,tdWm,t + β
J
i κm,tdJm,t + σi,tdWi,t + κi,tdJi,t, (5.13)
where the notations αt, σt, Wt, Jt, and κt are as defined in Eq (5.1), with sub-
scripts m and i referring to the aggregate market portfolio and individual stock
respectively.
As advanced in Todorov and Bollerslev (2010), Eq. (5.12) and (5.13) pro-
vide non-parametric representations of βCi , and βJi using multipower covaria-
tion/variation between the price processes of individual stocks and the market
portfolio for given continuous and jump components respectively. From the con-
tinuous components, we can estimate the continuous beta as follows:
βCi,t =
∑n
s=1 ri,t,srm,t,sI∑n
s=1 r
2
m,t,sI
, (5.14)
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where I is an indicator function,
I =

1 if |rt,s| ≤ θ
0 otherwise
, (5.15)
based on the the truncation threshold, θ, for continuous component. And from
the jump components, we can estimate the jump beta as follows:
βJi,t = sign {
∑n
s=1 sign{ri,t,srm,t,s}|ri,t,srm,t,s|τ}
×
(
|∑ns=1 sign{ri,t,srm,t,s}|ri,t,srm,t,s|τ |∑n
s=1 |rm,t,s|2τ
)1/τ
,
(5.16)
where τ is a positive number greater than or equal to 2 (Ait-Sahalia and Jacod,
2012; Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010). The sign in Eq. (5.16) is taken simply to
retain the sign of the jump beta that may be distorted while taking absolute
values. Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) show that the estimator in Eq. (5.16)
converges to true jump beta when there is at least one significant jump in the
market portfolio for the given estimation window.
An important aspect of estimating βCi and βJi is determining the continu-
ous and jump components in price processes. To do so Todorov and Bollerslev
(2010) suggest using different thresholds. The threshold for the continuous price
movement is θ = αCt
(
1
n
)ω where ω ∈ (0, 0.5) and αCt = 3√BVt suggesting that
the continuous component discards only those returns which are more than three
standard deviations away from mean, and unlikely to be associated with contin-
uous price movements (Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010). On the other hand the
threshold for the jump price movement is |rt,s| > αJt
(
1
n
)ω where αJt = 2√BVt
suggesting that the jump component discards only those returns which are within
two standard deviations from the mean, and are most likely to be associated with
continuous price movements.2 In line with existing literature, this chapter defines
2The choice of threshold level may vary. For example, Alexeev et al. (2014) do not use a
threshold for point estimate of βJi but use αJt =
√
BVt while estimating the asymptotic variance
of βJi . However, when we set τ ≥ 2, the continuous movements do not affect estimated jump
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the thresholds as αCt = 3
√
BVt for βCi as in Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) and
no threshold for βJi as in Alexeev et al. (2014).
5.3 Sample and Data
We consider US financial sector stocks for the period of January 2003 to December
2011. We initially select 77 financial firms comprising banks, insurance, broker-
dealers and other financial institutions from the S&P 500 high frequency dataset
compiled in Dungey et al. (2012). Of these, we remove ACE, which is a Swiss
insurance company, XL Capital, which is an Irish insurance company, Loews
Corp, which is a conglomerate of banks, hotels and other non-financial business
and Weyerhaeuser, which is a private owner of large timber lands in Canada. Our
final sample consists of 5-minute transactions prices (returns) on these 73 financial
firms listed in Table 5.3. We sub-divide the sample into 5 groups representing
sub-sectors within the financial sector: banks, dealers-brokers, insurers, REITs
and ‘others’.
We use the 5-minute based high-frequency data for sample firms extracted
from Thompson Reuters Tick History provided by SIRCA. Our intra-day data
starts from 9:30 am and ends at 4 pm. We exclude overnight returns. Thus we
have 78 intra-day observations for 2262 active trading days over a 9 year period
(108 months). The use of a 5-minute sampling frequency helps tradeoff between
microstructure noise and variance-bias (Andersen et al., 2007; Tauchen and Zhou,
2011).
We create an equally weighted index for the financial sector comprising these
73 firms over the sample period. The literature suggests that stock returns re-
spond more to sectoral effects or news compared with aggregate equity market
news, so that financial firms should respond more to financial sector news. Regu-
lation of the financial sector also provides a potential avenue for common effects.
beta asymptotically.
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Figure 5.1: Realized volatilties, bipower variations and jumps
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5.4 Results
5.4.1 Volatility Measures and Jumps
Figure 5.1 shows the daily realized volatility measures - realized volatility, bipower
variation and jumps in square root form (standard deviation) for the S&P 500
index and equally weighted financial sector index. The market volatilities are
relatively stable before the global financial crisis and increase during the crisis
period, reaching a peak during the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September
2008. The figure also reveals that the magnitude of volatilties and jumps in
financial sector index is more than three times larger than that for S&P 500
index. The heightened and prolonged volatilities in the US financial sector after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers is clearly evident in the figure for financial sector
index returns, while this is not the case for S&P 500 index returns. These results
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for daily US financial sector volatilities and jumps
RVt
√
RVt BVt
√
BVt Jt
√
Jt
Mean 0.284 0.383 0.242 0.353 0.045 0.127
Median 0.073 0.271 0.064 0.252 0.006 0.075
St. dev. 0.819 0.370 0.726 0.343 0.192 0.171
Skewness 8.698 3.303 10.175 3.427 15.644 3.968
Kurtosis 115.31 18.90 171.38 20.76 360.47 30.76
Min. 0.003 0.058 0.003 0.051 0.000 0.000
Max. 15.017 3.875 17.314 4.161 5.589 2.364
LB(Q− stat)10 2138 4226 1863 4041 572 1695
Observations 2262 2262 2262 2262 2262 2262
support our choice of equally weighted financial sector index as a benchmark
portfolio to estimate continuous and jump betas.
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for daily volatilties and jumps for the
financial sector index. These statistics are based on annualized daily measures.
The average realized volatility (
√
RV ) is about 38.3%, whereas the bipower vari-
ation (
√
BV ) is about 35.3%. The average absolute size of jump
√
J is about
12.7%. Jiang and Yao (2013) report a similar jump size for US stocks - the mean
jump size is about 14.14% and median jump size is about 11.74%. The variance
decompositions in Eq.(5.5) and (5.6) indicate that the proportion of variance
generated by the continuous returns component is about 85% (u 0.242/0.284)
and the jump returns component is about 15% (u 0.045/0.284).3 The Ljung-Box
portmanteau statistics for these series suggest a high degree of serial correlation
for up to tenth order. The results suggest the persistency and long memory
characteristics of volatility.
The bottom panels of Figure 5.1 reveal that many of the largest realized
volatilities are associated with jumps in the underlying price process. When we
apply the Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2006) approach to test for jumps at
0.1% significance level, over the sample period of 9 years, we observe at least
one significant jump in 87 days in the S&P 500 index, and in 70 days in equally
weighted financial sector index. Bollerslev et al. (2013) suggest that the presence
3Truncation of Jt in Eq. (5.6) makes some statistical discrepancy for RV = BV + J .
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of jumps may vary across sectors (industries). While looking at the identified
jump days in the financial sector index, we do not find any significant jumps
in September 2008, a month with heightened market uncertainty including the
bailout of AIG and collapse of Lehman Brothers. Since the financial sector is
more volatile than the aggregate market during the crisis period, finding a smaller
number of jumps for the overall sample period and no jumps in September 2008
using the financial sector index as the benchmark portfolio suggests that market
uncertainties may have masked the arrival of new information for the financial
sector. Patton and Verardo (2012) argue that investors revise their expectations of
the aggregate economy as a result of the arrival of new information in the market.
But when market uncertainty is high, which is a common feature of financial
markets during the crisis period, gathering and processing information could be
difficult and costly, and disturb the evolution of investors’ learning process. As a
result, even strong market news may not lead to a large and significant jump in
the price process. Fewer jumps during crisis periods is a common finding in the
literature (Chatrath et al., 2014; Alexeev et al., 2014).
Motivated by these identified jumps (with their corresponding months), we
now estimate monthly continuous systematic risk (continuous beta) and jump
systematic risk (jump beta) for the sample period. More specifically, we follow
Todorov and Bollerslev (2010) and estimate these betas for each firm in our
sample. We then link our results for systematic risk to systemic risk measures
suggested in Acharya et al. (2010) and Dungey et al. (2012).
5.4.2 The Systematic Risk Exposure of Financial Firms
Figure 5.2 illustrates the cross-sectional average of monthly betas (continuous and
jump) over the sample period. The average (mean) cross-sectional continuous
beta of financial firms is 1 as our benchmark portfolio is the equally weighted
returns of financial firms in our sample. The cross-sectional average (both mean
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Figure 5.2: Cross-sectional average continuous and jump betas
and median) jump beta of financial firms however is greater than continuous beta.
The average size of jump beta is 1.24 over the sample period which is consistent
with results from the literature that jump betas are larger in magnitude than
continuous betas (Alexeev et al., 2014; Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010). The larger
jump beta, therefore suggests that financial firms are exposed to significant price
discontinuities in price process of market portfolio, consistent with the argument
that the systematic risk of firms increases in a response to new information shock
in the market (Patton and Verardo, 2012).
To characterize the betas in Figure 5.2, and to aid our discussion, we split
the sample period into pre-crisis (before July 2007), crisis (July 2007 to May
2009) and post-crisis (June 2009 onwards) periods.4 Figure 5.2 shows that the
average mean and median jump betas decreased gradually over the sample pe-
riod, falling from 1.24 in pre-crisis period to 1.15 in the crisis period and then
picking up slightly to 1.18 during the post-crisis period (see Table 5.3 Panel B
first row). Caporale (2012) also find that the systematic risk of banks started
4We use the crisis period identified in Chapter 2
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Table 5.3: Continuous and jump betas
Total sample period Pre-crisis period Crisis period Post-crisis period
2003/01-2011/12 2003/01-2007/06 2007/07-2009/05 2009/06- 2011/12
Continuous beta: mean (standard deviation)
Overall 1.00 (0.32) 1.00 (0.36) 1.00 (0.28) 1.00 (0.30)
Banks 1.03 (0.28) 1.00 (0.30) 1.07 (0.23) 1.03 (0.26)
Dealers 1.24 (0.34) 1.42 (0.28) 1.18 (0.37) 0.99 (0.23)
Insurers 1.00 (0.32) 1.00 (0.27) 0.94 (0.33) 1.05 (0.38)
REITs 0.92 (0.33) 0.87 (0.40) 0.98 (0.22) 0.98 (0.24)
Others 0.97 (0.34) 1.02 (0.41) 0.92 (0.24) 0.92 (0.27)
Jump beta: mean (standard deviation)
Overall 1.24 (0.44) 1.32 (0.47) 1.15 (0.40) 1.18 (0.39)
Banks 1.24 (0.31) 1.23 (0.27) 1.26 (0.36) 1.24 (0.33)
Dealers 1.44 (0.44) 1.65 (0.38) 1.41 (0.49) 1.21 (0.34)
Insurers 1.22 (0.49) 1.25 (0.44) 1.07 (0.52) 1.25 (0.52)
REITs 1.21 (0.40) 1.37 (0.47) 1.08 (0.25) 1.06 (0.26)
Others 1.24 (0.34) 1.42 (0.71) 1.07 (0.32) 1.11 (0.33)
Note: The crisis period defined in table is based on the crisis period identified in Chapter 2.
declining since early 2000. We observe relatively smaller jump betas for the cri-
sis period (compared with pre-crisis and post-crisis level), despite the fact that
there was a series of events providing information to the market during the crisis
period. These results combined with results for market volatilities suggest that
increasing market uncertainties (volatilities) do not necessarily lead to increases
in the systematic jump risk response of financial firms. In other words, the fi-
nancial sector was priced as less risky during the period associated with rising
leverage and financial sector risk (Caporale, 2012). A possible explanation for
this decrease in systematic jump risk of financial firms during the crisis period
is the government intervention in the financial markets through TARP, bailouts,
capital injection, credit guarantees and liquidity support programs. The financial
firms in the sample are relatively large financial firms, so may be judged ‘too big
to fail’ and have had government support. Such stocks may not react aggres-
sively to the arrival of new information in the market. This reasoning aligns with
lack of significant jumps in any trading days during September 2008 - around the
collapse of Lehman Brothers.
Figure 5.3 shows the average cross-sectional continuous and jump betas at sub-
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Figure 5.3: Cross-sectional average betas at sub-sectoral level
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sectoral level indicating the composition of systematic risk within the financial
sector. During the pre-crisis period, broker-dealers exhibit the highest level of
response to systematic risk, both continuous and jump, as shown in Table 5.3.
During the crisis period, the broker-dealers continue to have the highest level of
response to systematic risk amongst financial firms, although this has decreased
compared with pre-crisis levels. However, the banks exhibit an increase in both
continuous and jump response to systematic risk during the GFC whereas REITs
experience only an increase in the continuous response to systematic risk. The
level of systematic risk response for the post-crisis period for banks, broker-dealers
and insurers is similar. We performed pairwise mean tests across sub-sectors
across different sampling window; we find that broker-dealers in respective pairs
have significantly higher systematic risk exposure before and during the GFC but
not after the GFC at least while pairing it with banks and insurers.
The results also reveal that banks and insurers have similar systematic risk,
although during the GFC banks exhibit higher systematic risk than insurers.5
The similar time-varying structure of continuous and jump betas of banks and
insurance companies casts doubt on arguments about different risk structure for
these two types of financial institutions, at least while observing their stock price
processes. Our results align with Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Dungey et al.
(2014) who argue that insurers are as systemically risky as banks. Figure 3
further reveals that REITs tend to have lowest continuous systematic risk response
compared with other sub-sectors, although they exhibit very high systematic
jump risk parameters during 2004-2005 which aligns with the real estate bubble
in REIT stocks.
5When we performed pairwise mean test for banks and insurers, the null of no singnificant
difference was rejected only for the crisis period.
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5.4.3 Systematic and Systemic Risks
In this section we examine the relationship between systematic jump risk re-
sponses and the systemic risk of the financial firms. This chapter is the first to
establish this relationship empirically. Brownlees and Engle (2012) implement
Acharya et al. (2010) and identify the systemic capital shortfall risk for each fi-
nancial firm. The SRISK index of Brownlees and Engle (2012) ranks the US
financial firms (including the majority of firms in our sample) on a weekly basis
through the Volatility Institute (VLab) of New York University.6 The SIFIRank
index of Dungey et al. (2012) ranks the systemic risk of financial firms determined
by the interconnectedness amongst firms (Dungey et al., 2012). We use these two
systemic risk measures for our sample firms and formalize the relationship be-
tween systematic risk, in particular, systematic jump risk and the systemic risk
in a panel regression model as follows:
βJi,t = γ1V LBi,t + γ2DLVi,t +Xi,tϕ+ δi + ui,t (5.17)
where V LB is the SRISK ranking of V-Lab, DLV is the SIFIRank index of
Dungey et al. (2012), X is a row vector of control variables, γs and ϕ (a column
vector) are parameters of interest, δ is an intercept and u are residuals. Subscripts
i and t refer to firm and time respectively. The corporate finance literature sug-
gests that firm characteristics also affect the systematic risk of the firm (Camp-
bell et al., 2010; Hamada, 1972; Mandelker and Rhee, 1984; Subrahmanyam and
Thomadakis, 1980). Therefore, we use three control variables: firm size (SIZ -
log of equity market capitalization), liquidity (LIQ - liquid assets to total assets),
and leverage (LEV - total debt to total assets) to capture firm characteristics.
We include one additional control variable, implied market volatility (∆V IX, log
difference of V IX index close) to capture the impact of market volatility. The
data for V IX are downloaded from Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)
6Available in http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk
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website7 and data for other explanatory variables are available from Thomson
Reuters Datastream and compiled in Dungey et al. (2012).8
Table 5.4: Correlation matrix
βJ DLV V LB ∆V IX LIQ SIZ LEV
βJ 1.00
DLV 0.15 1.00
V LB -0.39 -0.03 1.00
∆V IX 0.00 -0.02 0.07 1.00
LIQ -0.10 0.25 0.28 -0.01 1.00
SIZ -0.15 -0.65 0.10 0.05 -0.24 1.00
LEV 0.20 -0.18 -0.60 -0.03 -0.60 0.17 1.00
We restrict our sample to match data available for systemic risk measures
(V LB and DLV ). Doing this limits our sample size to 56 firms and sample
period to January 2005 to December 2011 which includes 56 months that have
at least one jump.
Table 5.4 provides the correlation matrix of our variables of interest in Eq.(5.17).
The table suggests that systemic risk measures are highly correlated with some
firm characteristic variables. For example, the SIFIRank index (DLV ) is highly
correlated with the size of the firm and the SRISK index (V LB) is highly corre-
lated with the leverage ratio, consistent with underlying tenets of these systemic
risk indices (see Acharya et al., 2010; Brownlees and Engle, 2012; Dungey et al.,
2012).9 The table also reveals a relatively high correlation between leverage and
liquidity. The literature on corporate finance suggests there the firm character-
istic variables are interrelated (Ozkan, 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Hence,
considering the possible multicollinearity issue amongst the explanatory variables,
we estimate Eq.(5.17) with alternative combinations of explanatory variables.
The results reported in Table 5.5 reveal that both the systemic risk measures
have significant influence on systematic jump risk; V LB and DLV have statis-
7http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/historical.aspx, accessed on 03/12/2012.
8Data for liquidity (LIQ) is available only on quarterly frequency. So we use available
quarterly data for respective months in the given quarter.
9In SIFIRank index of Dungey et al. (2012), each firm is assigned with its relative weight
in the network based on relative firm characteristics and in SRISK index of Acharya et al.
(2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2012), equity capital is the fundamental input.
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Table 5.5: Panel fixed effects regression results
Model Dependent variable: Jump beta (βJ)
specifications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V LB -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0009*** -0.0009***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
DLV 0.0033*** 0.0034*** 0.0039*** 0.0048*** 0.0025***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0008)
∆V IX 0.0339 0.0108 -0.0053 0.0538* 0.0486
(0.0301) (0.0270) (0.0281) (0.0305) (0.0298)
LIQ -0.1322 -0.0329 -0.1344
(0.1329) (0.1194) (0.1275)
LEV 0.0029*** 0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0008)
SIZ -0.1189*** -0.0821
(0.0394) (0.0502)
Constant 1.2154*** 1.2175*** 1.0208*** 1.0198*** 4.0675*** 3.1054**
(0.0478) (0.0481) (0.0320) (0.0348) (0.8988) (1.1672)
R-sq: overall 0.1597 0.1648 0.0662 0.0242 0.0947 0.1188
N 3076 3076 3076 3076 3076 3076
Note: The variables V LB is the SRISK ranking index of V-Lab, DLV is the SIFIRank
ranking index of Dungey et al. (2012), ∆V IX is the log difference of VIX closing index, LIQ
is the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets, and
SIZ is the log of equity market capitalization. The sample period used for the estimation
is Janaury 2005 to December 2011 using daily data. Huber/White/sandwich standard errors
are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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tically significant coefficients across all the model specifications. In the case of
V LB, the coefficients are negative, which implies that financial firms with higher
capital risk tend to have higher systematic jump risk. Note that smaller values
of the V LB index suggest higher capital shortfall risk. The literature on bank
capital and risk taking also suggests that banks engaging in riskier projects tend
to have lower capital (Altunbas et al., 2007; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Kwan and
Eisenbeis, 1997), therefore, such firms are more responsive to market shocks. The
estimated relationships between DLV and the systematic jump risk have positive
coefficients. As smaller values of the DLV index indicate higher level of inter-
connectedness in the network, the results suggest an inverse relationship between
interconnectedness and systematic jump risk, indicating that interconnected fi-
nancial firms are less responsive to market jumps. In other words, financial firms
with stronger network connections tend to share risk through networks and there-
fore are more resilient to jumps in the market.
The marginal effects of both systemic risk indices are small. For example, a
1 unit change in the DLV SIFIRank index changes jump beta by only 0.0033
unit and a 1 unit change in V LB SRISK index changes jump beta by 0.0013. To
change jump beta to 1.25 from its mean level of 1.24 would require an increase
of 3 in the SIFIRank index or a decrease of 8 in the V LB SRISK index.
Therefore, firms interconnectedness and/or expected capital shortfall risk has to
change dramatically to affect the jump beta. Brownlees and Engle (2012) and
Dungey et al. (2012) show that the respective systemic risk indices can move
quite a long way rapidly, particularly during stressful periods, in which case we
may also see the changes in jump beta.
The results for control variables indicate that although the implied market
volatility has some positive effect on systematic jump risk, the relationship is weak
- the coefficient for ∆V IX is significant only in Model 5 suggesting that changes
in market volatility (risk) are less likely to explain systematic risk, particularly
for the financial firms. This result is consistent with our findings in Section 5.4.1
5 Jump Risk in the US Financial Sector 105
and 5.4.2 where we observed fewer jumps and relatively small jump betas during
the periods of high market volatility. Another possible explanation is that as
V IX measures the implied volatilities of S&P 500 index options, and as evident
from Figure 1, where the financial sector has a different pattern of volatilities,
V IX may not be a close proxy of market volatilities for financial firms.
Firm characteristics such as leverage and firm size have significant explanatory
power in explaining systematic jump risk. The results reveal that financial firms
with higher leverage (debt capital) are more responsive to jumps in the market.
As higher leverage ratios make financial firms riskier, these highly leveraged firms
are more sensitive to market jumps. This finding supports our earlier findings for
V LB. The estimated results for firm size suggest that smaller firms tend to have
larger jump betas than larger firms. Jiang and Yao (2013) also report that small
stocks have higher jump returns. Our results for firm liquidity, however, suggest
an insignificant inverse relationship with liquidity. The literature suggests that a
higher level of liquidity provides financial firms with the flexibility to cope with
market shocks (price discontinuities).
Our sample period includes the global financial crisis, and therefore we check
for a potential structural shift and break during the GFC in Eq.(5.17) using a
dummy variable and dummy interactive variables for each model specification in
Table 5.5. We do not find any evidence for structural shift in any of the model
specifications - the coefficient for the crisis dummy is not significant. However, we
do find some evidence of structural breaks. For example, during the crisis period
V IX exhibits a positive and significant coefficient in all model specifications and
liquidity tends to have a statistically significant negative coefficient.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter identifies jumps in the US financial sector and estimates the system-
atic risk responses to these jumps for the panel of 73 large US financial firms for
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the period of 2003-2011 using high frequency data. It then examines the relation-
ship between systematic jump risk (jump beta) and the capital shortfall systemic
risk measures of Acharya et al. (2010) and the interconnectedness systemic risk
measure of Dungey et al. (2012).
Of 108 months in the sample, we find at least one significant jump in the
financial sector index for 70 months and that financial firms respond aggressively
to jumps in the market. The jump betas are consistently greater than 1 and
larger than continuous betas suggesting the importance of including jumps in
modeling the price process and the relevance of jump beta in portfolio manage-
ment. Amongst the financial institutions, banks tend to have lower systematic
risk exposure than broker-dealers but higher than insurers. The results for a re-
lationship between systematic jump risk and systemic risk reveal that financial
institutions with higher capital shortfall risk also have higher jump risk response,
whereas more interconnected financial institutions tend to have lower jump risk
response. Firm characteristics such as leverage and size also have significant ef-
fect on systematic jump risk and equity capital reduces systematic jump risk.
Therefore, higher equity capital for financial firms works as a cushion against
risk.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation examines the contagion effects of the financial crisis that began
in the US in 2007 and spread to become a global financial crisis affecting a large
number of other economies. The definition of contagion in the existing literature
is contested. This dissertation concentrates on comparing the empirical evidence
for contagion using several alternative specifications to test for its existence and
relative contribution to observed market volatility. The first model considers
contagion measured as the effect of an idiosyncratic shock originating from the
US. A latent factor model approach provides evidence of contagion effects via
idiosyncratic shocks across the world’s largest advanced and emerging economies.
Applications of contagion tests in the existing literature largely consider eq-
uity market evidence, and in cross-country studies this is usually represented
with market index data. We compare results using this measure with those for
financial sector index data for each country. This explicitly addresses the issue
of whether the financial sector is primarily responsible for transmitting crises
internationally via contagion. Surprisingly, the results from Chapters 2 and 3
indicate less evidence of contagion in the financial sector indices than in the over-
all market indices. We check the robustness of these results by implementing a
conditional factor model, complementing to the initial unconditional model, and
find the results are qualitatively similar.
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The second modeling approach applied in this dissertation divides contagion
into four potential channels: (i) transmissions through common shocks, which
impact all the markets simultaneously, although with potentially different factor
loadings, (ii) transmissions through idiosyncratic shocks from the crisis originat-
ing market, akin to the latent factor model (iii) potential structural shifts in
the relationship between markets, analogous to the concept of shift contagion in
Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and finally (iv) transmissions via volatility shocks.
The evidence from 49 international banking markets supports the existence of con-
tagion effects, although the dominant contagion channels differs across economies,
as analysed in Chapter 4.
These alternative, but complementary, approaches all lead to the conclusion
that contagion effects are evident across equity markets worldwide, in both the
banking sector and overall market indices. The specific results for each chapter
build understanding of the international propagation of crises via the avenue of
contagion.
In Chapter 2, we examine contagion from the US to the equity markets of
the world’s largest advanced and emerging economies. The focus in this chapter
is to test for idiosyncratic contagion and its contribution to market volatility.
The results reveal that the equity markets show evidence of contagion and this
effect can explain a large proportion of market volatility. For some emerging
economies, such as India and Russia, the contribution of contagion to market
volatility exceeds that detected in the advanced economies. However, when we
assess contagion effects across the financial sectors of these economies, conta-
gion explains a very small proportion of sectoral level volatility in the advanced
economies.
In Chapter 3, we assess contagion through a common factor channel, and find
evidence for its existence in the equity markets of both advanced and emerging
economies. We find a significant break in the structural relationship between
markets at both the aggregate equity index level as well as at financial sector
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level. The clear evidence of structural breaks across a wide variety of markets
strongly supports the need to accommodate this feature in modeling contagion.
In Chapter 4, we propose a model to examine contagion from the four possible
contagion channels outlined above, and use it to assess evidence for contagion in
banking sectors around the world. We find significant contagion in most of the
banking sectors considered. The form of contagion varies across the sample,
although when contagion is present, shift contagion is always evident. When we
examine which form of contagion lead to systemic banking crises, we find that
idiosyncratic contagion increases the probability of systemic crisis by 27 percent.
Consequently, policy makers need to pay due attention to idiosyncratic shock
channel in responding contagion and attempting to mitigate the crises effects.
The potential risk of contagion, and the consequent systemic risk in the bank-
ing sector, prompts an investigation of how financial firms respond to market
shocks in Chapter 5. We consider the evidence for responses to discontinuous
movements in the high frequency equity prices for US financial institutions using
a recent approach to distinguish beta in response to continuous market move-
ments from beta associated with jumps. Jumps often represent the significant
effects of new information arrival to the market. We find that financial firms
respond to jumps aggressively, and this is particularly the case for firms with
higher capital shortfall systemic risk.
In summary, the dissertation corroborates the existence of financial contagion
and its contribution to market volatility during the 2007-2009 crisis period across
a variety of empirical approaches. However, an important issue which arises from
our research is to identify what kinds of policy interventions might be effective
in mitigating the contagion effects. These interventions would target policy re-
sponses tailored to shutting down the effects of transmission uniquely associated
with the crisis origin, rather than focus on the systematic and volatility effects
which seem to be relatively well addressed in the current environment. Some ex-
amples which may fit in this category include short-sales restrictions, and capital
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flow restrictions, both of which are widely regarded as having had some success
in containing the geographic spread of crises in the past. Other innovative ap-
proaches are needed to provide the regulatory authorities with a wide-ranging
armament with which to meet the challenges of future crisis events.
Policy makers around the world, at national and supranational levels, are
currently developing macro-prudential regulations which aim to prevent, manage
and mitigate future financial crises and associated contagion effects. The key
concerns are ensuring that the global financial system is resilient to crisis shocks,
reducing systemic risk, and managing crises when they do occur. A new strand of
academic and policy research has emerged to address these issues in the aftermath
of the recent crisis (e.g. Acharya et al. 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier 2011;
Allen and Babus 2009; Dungey et al. 2012; Hanson et al. 2011). The results
from Chapter 4 and 5 of this dissertation point to the importance of capital
regulation (via leverage) in addressing systemic and systematic risk, and support
a future research agenda which explores the possible means of detecting and
managing global SIFIs. The contagion results support the importance of SIFIS
in the international financial system, and prompt further consideration of the role
international and domestic regulatory policy around these financial institutions
may play in preventing and mitigating the international transmission of such
crises.
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